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ABSTRACT 
In order for the smallest units of government—towns, villages, small cities, and rural 
areas—in the least populated areas of the country to successfully meet the national 
preparedness, response, recovery, and interoperability goals of the National Preparedness 
Guidelines, they must adhere to the compliance metrics of the National Incident 
Management System. This ensures personnel and resource accountability as well as 
successful multiagency coordination during times of disaster. 
Efforts by small towns and rural areas to meet NIMS compliance standards have 
been problematic. Failure of some units of government to meet these requirements has 
affected their ability to effectively respond to and recover from major disasters, as 
evidenced when coordinating with resources outside their immediate area or NIMS-
compliant agencies. NIMS is built around the concept that all units of government and all 
disciplines from the federal to the local level must not only understand their role during 
incident response but also have the ability to seamlessly interoperate with each other and 
account for personnel and resources to successfully manage an incident. This research 
examines the reasons for the inability of some small towns and rural areas to meet these 
preparedness standards. The research findings drive the proposed solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION - DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
A. BACKGROUND 
Depending on the definition of “rural,” it has been estimated that from 17 to 49 
percent of the population of the United States live in rural areas of the country. Rural 
areas may cover as much as 80 percent of the landmass (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, pp.  
29–30). The demographic of our population that live in small towns and rural 
communities is estimated at 50 million people (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & 
Colocousis, 2008, p. 6). The challenges these rural inhabitants face in the public safety 
and homeland security arenas are many and come from every corner. They receive their 
law enforcement services from relatively small sheriff’s departments and the occasional 
small-town police department with a few part-time and full-time officers. The fire and 
emergency medical services (EMS) are generally staffed by volunteers or paid-on-call 
personnel who have other full-time jobs that provide their livelihood.  
In rural areas, emergency management is usually the purview of one emergency 
manager for an entire county, with little or no staff support. The local township or village 
hall may have just one full-time clerk who runs the day-to-day operations of the 
municipality, including finances, community relations, and logistics. Full-time county 
road crews that run plow trucks, road graders, and salters are sparse and usually have 
little additional staff to call in during times of emergency. Communication modalities, 
including the Internet and cell-phone coverage in rural areas and in small towns, are not 
as widespread as urban areas. Public power supply infrastructure is more brittle than in 
urban areas, and repair crews are stretched thin. All of these factors lead rural residents to 
rely more on the goodwill of their neighbors than the government for help during 
emergencies. They understand the mutual benefit that comes with building relationships 
based on a common need.  
The economics of small-town and rural America are more fragile than their urban 
counterparts. “Rural areas often lack economic diversity; they frequently rely on a limited 
number of industries, which can limit job advancement and make rural jobs more 
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vulnerable to market forces and industrial restructuring” (Jensen, 2006, p. 3). The 
economic downturn of the last several years has led to greater unemployment in these 
areas as factories close with little hope of other employment. As the number of jobs in 
rural areas fell, “the nonmetro unemployment rate rose to 9.2 percent in the second 
quarter of 2009, up from 5.2 percent a year earlier. This was the highest second-quarter 
nonmetro unemployment rate since 1983” (United States Department of Agriculture 
[USDA], 2009, p. 3). Some rural counties only have one or two major employers, and 
when they close or lay off workers, there is no other place for residents to work, unlike 
their urban cousins, who can search elsewhere in the same city. Rural farmers, feed mills 
and agra-businesses find it more difficult to hire help because prices will not support 
additional salaries. Many rural residents work multiple part-time jobs just to keep their 
families going and pay their mortgages. In some areas of the country, rural education 
systems can be substandard, especially in poor counties where few rural adults are likely 
to have a college degree. Both of these factors limit the ability of rural workers to secure 
good jobs or to attract and create quality jobs in rural places (Jensen, 2006, p. 3).  
“Poverty rates are higher and more enduring in rural America due to a number of 
factors: limited economic diversity, isolation and sparse population, and lower 
educational levels among working adults” (Jensen, 2006, p. 4). Municipal tax bases that 
support rural governments have shrunk as bankruptcies and unemployment have 
exploded. That tax money is needed to provide the spartan level of public services needed 
in rural areas. Many communities have no extra or discretionary funds to spend on 
unfunded mandates from the federal government or to use to plan, prepare, or train for a 
disaster that may never come. All of these factors have a negative  cumulative effect on 
emergency management and public safety—key parts of the homeland security project.  
Another problem facing small-town and rural America is that the population 
migration rates have fallen off steeply over the last decade. Rural areas are not gaining in 
population and barely sustaining what they have due to a number of factors, including an 
aging population demographic and an emigration of young adults looking for work. 
Metro areas have grown at twice the rate of rural areas since 2000 (USDA, 2009, p. 5). 
This “likely occurred among all age groups because it corresponds with the mortgage 
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foreclosure crisis that began in late 2006 and the onset of the current economic recession 
in late 2007. Net migration rates dropped most sharply in counties with the highest 
foreclosure rates” (USDA, 2009, p. 5). 
All of these factors have led rural Americans to rely on their neighbors and 
friends, not the federal government, for mutual aid. “Self-reliance, reinforced by mutual 
assistance, is a fundamental American virtue” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 158). Because of their 
economic tentativeness, physical dispersal, and emotional isolation, rural Americans band 
together in times of need, share resources, and work as one. However, even with this 
admirable trait, local capacity to handle a large-scale or widespread disaster, attack, or 
cataclysmic event is very limited, and their capacity to respond is easily overwhelmed. 
B. DEFINING RURAL AREAS 
Work completed by William Eller in his NPS—CHDS thesis research, 
“Leveraging Rural America in the Fight against Terrorism in America through the Use of 
Conservation Districts” (2010), indicates that there are various definitions for what is 
considered a small town or rural area. His research shows that the federal government has 
different definitions for what is considered rural, depending on the agency and on the 
parameters of the grant programs. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines “local 
government,” as including “rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other 
public entity” (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.). Government 
websites have been established to determine whether a user is “rural” for purposes of 
federal programs (Rural Assistance Center, 2008). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 
“rural” refers to people and places in non-metropolitan counties, while “urban” refers to 
metropolitan counties. In general terms, metro areas consist of a county with one or more 
urbanized areas with a total population of 50,000 or more. Metro areas consist of both 
cities and suburbs. 
All definitions are subject to considerable variation for socioeconomic 
characteristics (Eller, 2010, p. 19). The typical method in defining rural is to establish 
“urban” first, and whatever is left constitutes “rural.” In population statistics, for instance,  
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the “rural population is what is left over once the cities are counted” (Drabenstott, 2002, 
p. 2). Figure 1 depicts the size and scope of the Census Bureau’s definition of “rural,” 
using nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Non-metropolitan and Metropolitan Counties Meeting the Census Bureau 
Definition of “Rural” (From U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, 2004). 
For the purpose of this thesis, small-town and rural areas are defined as 
unincorporated areas of a county and incorporated townships and villages with 
populations under 10,000 for townships and fewer than 50,000 in total for the entire 
county. Rural governments are generally served by a small paid staff and many public 
safety volunteers. Residents are geographically isolated or dispersed outside of the towns 
and villages and are not in close proximity or adjacent to large metropolitan areas. Small 
towns and rural municipalities have a tax base that most closely equals the geography of 
the services provided, requiring little state or federal funding. 
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C. AREA OF RESEARCH FOCUS 
The target area for this research is the state of Wisconsin, which is about 85 to 90 
percent rural. (See Figure 2). The total population in the state is 5,654,774, spread across 
72 counties, covering 54,310 square miles. Rural counties within the state may have as 
few as 12 persons per square mile as compared to the state average of 98 persons per 
square mile. There are more than 2,330 emergency response agencies in the state of 
Wisconsin from the local, tribal, and state levels (Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, 
[WOJA] 2008, p.3). The state of Wisconsin is governed under the home rule concept that 
was added to the state constitution in 1924 and included the wording granting cities the 
right to govern their own affairs: “Cities and Villages organized pursuant to state law 
may determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to 
such enactments for the legislature of statewide concern as with the uniformity shall 
affect every city or every village” (Milsap, 2008, p. 4). This law has resulted in the 
establishment of over 550 law enforcement agencies and over 850 fire departments in 
Wisconsin. 
 
Figure 2.   U.S. Census Bureau, Rural Population in Wisconsin. 
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Although Wisconsin has recognized the need for regional collaboration, it has 
focused on the urban areas, not the rural areas. The 2008 Wisconsin Preparedness Report 
states: “A key component of Wisconsin’s approach is the development of community-
based public-private partnerships in key urban areas of the state” (WOJA, 2008, p. 4). 
It is recognized that there is a lack of consistent NIMS application across the 
state, especially in the law enforcement realm: “Trainers, police chiefs, and emergency 
managers attribute a wide range of factors to the variance in NIMS implementation: lack 
of funding, inadequate staffing, competing priorities, lack of commitment by local 
government and law enforcement leadership, and the inability to turn NIMS theory into 
practice” (Bauer, 2009, p. 2). A 2006 report by the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau 
details law enforcement problems around the state with the use of a major component of 
NIMS, the Incident Command System. In a survey conducted in November 2006 of the 
72 county emergency management units regarding their activities, only half the counties 
even responded; of those respondents, one-half of the counties had “unanticipated 
problems in responding to recent emergencies, including that municipalities were not 
sufficiently prepared for an emergency” (Bauer, 2009, p. 7; Wisconsin Legislative Audit 
Bureau [WLAB], 2006, p. 3).  
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Background on Local Preparedness and National Preparedness 
Standards 
“The national preparedness system is, both literally and figuratively, only as 
strong as its weakest link.” 
National Academy of Public Administration, 2009, p. 64 
The federal government has chosen to measure national preparedness in the 
homeland security realm by insisting that government entities at the federal, state, tribal, 
and local levels meet the compliance requirements found in the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) (see Figure 1). This quantifiable method of calculation 
requires that all jurisdictions and agencies must meet 28 objectives (see Figure 3) and 
certify once a year that they have done so through a system called the NIMS Compliance 
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Assistance Support Tool (NIMCAST). This research examines and compares 11 NIMS 
objectives that are related to response. NIMCAST is a self-assessment instrument for 
state, tribal, and local governments to evaluate and report their jurisdiction’s 
implementation of NIMS to the federal government. This thesis analyzed those objectives 
related to response. 
NIMS Objectives 
 
1. Adopt NIMS by all departments/agencies; 
2. Planning process to implement NIMS objectives across government; 
3. Single point of contact for NIMS; 
4. Grants must support NIMS objectives; 
5. Grant audits must include NIMS objectives; 
6. Assist tribes with NIMS adoption; 
7. Revise EOPs, SOPs, to include NIMS; 
8. Develop mutual aid agreements; 
9. Training to deliver NIMS; 
10. Implement IS-700; 
11. Implement IS-800; 
12. Implement ICS-100; 
13. Implement ICS-200; 
14. Implement ICS-300; 
15. Implement ICS-400; 
16. Incorporate NIMS into all training and exercises; 
17. All-hazards, multi-discipline exercise program; 
18. Incorporate corrective action plans; 
19. Apply plain language communications; 
20. Systems and tools: common operating picture; 
21. Inventory assets by kind and type; 
22. Interoperable communications, equipment, and systems; 
23. Mutual aid agreements (EMAC); 
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24. Credentialing personnel; 
25. All incidents must use ICS, IAP, UC; 
26. Multi-agency coordination: use MACS; 
27. Public information: use PIO, JIC, JIS; 
28. Ensure public information is accurate and can be disseminated during events. 
Beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2005, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD)-5 requires federal departments and agencies to make adoption of NIMS by state 
and local organizations a condition for federal preparedness assistance through grants, 
contracts, or other activities. The National Integration Center relies on its implementation 
guidelines (objectives) contained in NIMSCAST to determine whether states have met 
the HSPD-5 adoption requirement (USDHS, FEMA, n.d.4). 
A problem facing the nation is that the smallest units of government—towns, 
villages, and rural counties—in the least populated areas of the country are unable or 
unwilling to achieve the levels of preparedness expected by the National Preparedness 
Guidelines and the compliance metrics of the National Incident Management System 
(White House, 2003, p. 3). A blunt conclusion stated succinctly in the 2008 study 
conducted by the National Emergency Managers Association (NEMA) on barriers to 
NIMS compliance speaks to the heart of the issue: “Poorer, rural states can’t meet 
implementation, training, compliance requirements” (NEMA, 2008). Many rural areas of 
the country appear not to have the ability or feel the need to be part of the national 
preparedness community. The National Incident Management System sets preparedness 
standards for the federal government, the states, tribes, and all local jurisdictions in 
aggregate and as individual entities, regardless of their size or location, urban or rural.  
Efforts to meet preparedness requirements such as the use of standardized methodologies, 
integration, coordination, planning, and interoperation with other communities are 
problematic for the smallest units of government due to many factors, including the costs, 
time and personnel involved, and a lack of operational and administrative capacity. 
The lack of resources exacerbates the problem of meeting the 28 annual NIMS 
compliance requirements. A great deal of time and effort is needed to become NIMS 
compliant and to meet the national preparedness goal. It is speculated that many small 
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jurisdictions and communities do not attempt these activities. This results in a 
preparedness disparity between small and large jurisdictions. The disparity between large 
and rural communities creates major problems when NIMS-compliant jurisdictions 
attempt to interoperate with those who are not during events, incidents, or disasters. 
Agencies are working from different standard operating procedures, causing ineffective, 
inefficient, and sometimes costly command and control problems. Examples of this issue 
can be found during the response to the largest commercial fire in Wisconsin history on 
July 5, 2009, in Cudahy, just south of Milwaukee. Over 400 firefighters from 64 different 
fire departments responded over the four days of active fire fighting, evacuation, and 
security. This was an example of small jurisdictions and larger jurisdictions supporting 
one another during a major incident. Many on-scene command and control functions 
worked well, including Unified Command, due to a prior commitment to the 
institutionalization of ICS by the fire services. However some of the deeper components 
of the ICS were problematic as they are rarely used. The ordering of some fire resources 
did not follow standardized NIMS typing requirements and on one occasion, the wrong 
piece of fire apparatus was dispatched to the scene from many miles away in a 
neighboring municipality. It had to be sent back and the correct piece dispatched because 
the requestor and the receiver were not speaking the same language. The impact was that 
a critical piece of equipment that was needed on scene did not respond where and when it 
was needed.  
This topic merits further research because there is a lack of common 
understanding of the scope and scale of the problem and the lack of potential solutions in 
homeland security literature. We have only an anecdotal grasp of the reasons why smaller 
agencies and rural jurisdictions in less populated areas do not feel that they have the 
ability or need to be part of the national preparedness community. This thesis researches 
the problems and offers possible solutions. These solutions can be used as a national 
model to increase overall preparedness across jurisdictional boundaries, no matter the 
size, through a wider distribution of customized response and recovery capability 
regardless of the population base. Achieving the national preparedness goal by following 
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the national preparedness guidelines to meet NIMS requirements will lead to improved 
preparedness and operations with and among all jurisdictions. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research Question #1: How do asymmetries in NIMS adoption impact inter-
local cooperation in times of crisis? 
Research Question #2: For those small jurisdictions that are not meeting the 
standards and objectives as defined by NIMS, what are the reasons? 
Research Question #3: If there are impacts to inter-local cooperation due to 
asymmetric NIMS adoption, what are the systemic and long-term solutions? 
F. BENEFITS/SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research explores the reasons for the problem, leading to the development of 
potential solutions to fill the gap that has been identified between rural and urban 
preparedness levels. The goal is for rural inclusion in the greater homeland security 
project.  This research develops the knowledge needed to set a clear path forward to 
develop new rural/small-town guidance on aligning strategies with the national 
preparedness goal.  
This thesis serves to fill a void in the research and literature on the difficulties 
experienced by the smallest units of government in this demographic and the reasons why 
they are struggling to meet the national preparedness goal. As will be discussed in the 
literature review, much has been written about the federal NIMS requirements to reach 
the NPG, but there has been little research into the fundamental difficulties encountered 
by small towns and rural communities to reach that goal (Clovis, 2006b). Furthermore, 
there does not appear to be a body of literature comparing and contrasting, or even 
recognizing, the different preparedness levels between large, urbanized areas and their 
small and rural counterparts. This hole in the research must be filled if we are to 
understand the problem and then build true preparedness across the entire government 
spectrum, no matter the size of the jurisdiction.  
11  
The research is beneficial to states around the country experiencing the same 
disparity in distribution of preparedness between their largest urban areas and smallest 
rural areas, and it opens up the topic for future academic examination. The immediate 
consumers of this research will be the State of Wisconsin’s Governor’s Homeland 
Security Council, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the National 
Integration Center (NIC) Incident Management Systems Integration (IMSI) Division.  
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature addressing the struggle by the smallest units of government—
unincorporated towns, villages, and rural counties in less populated areas of the country, 
in meeting national preparedness standards and objectives as defined by the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) is spotty and anecdotal.  The NIMS standards 
themselves have evolved from the National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2002 and 
2007, as well as Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) 5 and 8; however, 
research on the compliance efforts and failures of these small units of government is 
lacking.  
The literature supporting this research is diverse and can be broken down into a 
number of sub-sections:  
 Parallel and historical efforts (national, regional, and state levels);  
 Federal publications detailing the requirements;  
 State and local efforts at meeting those requirements;  
 Academia and subject-matter expert analysis on compliance; and  
 After-action reports (AAR) detailing the consequences of compliance 
failures.  
1. Parallel and Historical Efforts 
Systems to organize national preparedness are not new. A historical perspective 
on the development of these systems is important because we can learn from past 
successes and failures. Similar systems and attendant literature have been examined, 
including the fire service’s Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) of Wisconsin and 
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Illinois. The system’s main tenets call for standardized credentialing of personnel and 
developing standardized mutual-aid response protocols much like NIMS (MABAS, 
2008). Law enforcement’s Suburban Mutual Aid Response Taskforce (S.M.A.R.T.) of 
southeast Wisconsin is also another example that was explored because it parallels NIMS 
ideals as well. Both systems provide a track record of proven usefulness of concepts 
parallel to the NIMS ideals.  
A historical perspective can be found in the comparative literature of past 
attempts at national-level preparedness as in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s executive 
order in May 1941, when he established the Office of Civilian Defense, the precursor of 
FEMA, after reestablishing the Council of National Defense the year before. The 
National Security Act of 1947 was signed by President Truman. It realigned and 
reorganized the U.S. Armed Forces, foreign policy, and intelligence community in order 
to better coordinate civil-military affairs. The act merged the Department of War and the 
Department of the Navy into the National Military Establishment, supervised by the 
Secretary of Defense. It also created a separate Department of the Air Force from the 
existing Army Air Forces, created the Central Intelligence Agency and the National 
Security Agency, and mandated a major reorganization of the foreign-policy and military 
establishments of the U.S. government (National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401 
et seq.). This major realignment of the government was as dramatic then as was the 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. 
Each of these examples agrees on the desired end state—better national 
preparedness—but each takes a different track to get there, with varied success. The 
MABAS has grown from a concept in the state of Illinois and developed into a regional 
effort including several neighboring states. Wisconsin’s fire service saw firsthand the 
applicability and practicality of the system. Through the efforts of Oak Creek Fire Chief 
Brian Satula and the Wisconsin Fire Chief’s Association, the MABAS system was 
adopted for statewide implementation. This state- and regional-driven mutual-aid pact 
has direct relevance to NIMS and is an example of what can be achieved without federal 
requirements. 
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Literature establishing a historical perspective of past efforts to nationalize 
preparedness efforts from the top levels of the federal government down to the local 
levels was examined, including materials regarding the Council for the National Defense, 
which was first established in 1916 with the passage of a bill in Congress to facilitate 
national efforts for the First World War.  The council was a presidential advisory board 
that included responsibilities for “coordinating resources and industries for national 
defense” and “stimulating civilian morale” (USHDS, Homeland Security National 
Preparedness Taskforce, 2006). In May 1940, as World War II exploded across Europe, 
President Roosevelt reestablished the Council of National Defense (Executive Order 
6443A, 1933). From that board, the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) was established to 
meet civil population needs in war time, including the protection of the civilian 
population, the maintenance of morale, and the promotion of volunteer involvement in 
defense. The OCD was also charged with ensuring that federal agencies responded to 
community needs resulting from the war. (Office of Civilian Defense website, n.d.). The 
Council of National Defense, the OCD and the National Security Act established a 
historical track that the Department of Homeland Security and NIMS would follow 60 
years later when war again forced the nation to prepare to defend itself, this time from 
terrorists. 
2. Federal Publications 
These federal documents are mainly official orders and guidance from the federal 
government since the beginning of NIMS in 2003. The documents detail the preparedness 
requirements but fail to address a variety of implementation issues, including the 
inflexibility of the dictated singular model and design approach of the Incident Command 
System. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic 
Incidents, directed the development and administration of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) (USDHS, FEMA, 2008b). Originally issued on March 1, 
2004, by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), these documents set standards for 
the federal government, the states, tribes, and all local jurisdictions in aggregate and as 
individual entities, no matter their size or location. As defined in the Homeland Security 
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Act of 2002, the term “state” means any state of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States 
(6 U.S.C. §101 (14)). Citizens, private sector, and non-governmental organizations are 
also included as part of a prepared nation in the guidelines and in NIMS. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness, March 31, 
2005, defines national preparedness as “the existence of plans, procedures, policies, 
training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the 
ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events. The term ‘readiness,’ is 
used interchangeably with preparedness in this document.” HSPD-8 refers to 
preparedness for major events as “all-hazards preparedness.” It defines major events as 
“domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.” Two years later, in 
September of 2007, the statement was further refined in the National Preparedness 
Guidelines as a preparedness vision for the nation: “A NATION PREPARED with 
coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all 
hazards in a way that balances risk with resources and need.”  
All of the HSPDs and NIMS guidance documents are designed to work hand in 
hand with the National Response Framework (NRF). NIMS provides the templates for 
the management of incidents, while the NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for 
national-level policy for incident management (USDHS, FEMA, 2008b). NIMSCAST is 
the standard tool now in use by agencies and jurisdictions around the country to measure 
and track their level of NIMS compliance. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s National Integration Center—Incident Management Systems Division 
developed NIMSCAST to help state, territorial, tribal, and local jurisdictions maintain 
their national baseline compliance, as established in FYs 2005–2006 (USDHA, FEMA, 
2009a). The web-based document consists of more than 300 pages of questions that must 
be answered in the affirmative to meet compliance standards. It is very thorough but does 
not designate what level of government is to complete the document or identify a passing 
score, resulting in no accountability to the standards. 
15  
An example of a regional approach to collaboration at the local level can be found 
in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, which provided state and 
local governments with the funding required for participation in the national effort to 
combat terrorism by creating the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program 
(Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2003). This financial assistance is provided to major 
urban centers to address the unique equipment, training, planning, and exercise needs of 
large, high-threat urban areas and to assist them in building an enhanced and sustainable 
capacity to prevent, respond to, and recover from threats or acts of terrorism (United 
States Office of Justice Programs [USOJP], 2003).  This funding was and is meant to 
address the needs of large urban areas, not just one large city but the metropolitan area 
surrounding it collectively; that can include up to five adjacent counties. This system 
addresses the needs of major urban areas but is deficient in bringing small or rural 
jurisdictions into the preparedness picture. Since little funding is provided for small or 
rural areas outside the UASI, the apparent assumption is that urban areas need greater 
protection and a greater level of preparedness than rural areas, due to a greater threat. But 
this threat matrix only takes into account the risk faced from attack, not all hazards.  
3. State and Local Efforts 
The Department of Homeland Security, through the Federal Emergency 
Management Association (FEMA), has recognized that there is a problem in obtaining 
NIMS compliance and has asked the states to identify compliance barriers. The National 
Emergency Management Association was requested by FEMA to compile remarks from 
its members across the nation regarding barriers to NIMS compliance. Many different 
problems were cataloged and discussed. This offered a rare glimpse into the true state of 
national preparedness. This document, titled State Responses—Barriers to NIMS 
Compliance (NEMA, 2008), was very useful as it gave an unvarnished look at the state of 
NIMS compliance from the viewpoint of the states. The respondents collectively stated 
that compliance is not a static state but is constantly shifting and changing. They noted 
that “cookie-cutter” requirements do not work for different types and sizes of 
jurisdictions. Another identified barrier was the inability of poorer,  
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rural states to meet implementation, training, and compliance requirements. NEMA 
suggested that the regional approach to compliance should be incorporated to bring 
greater preparedness across jurisdictional levels, regardless of their size or location. 
Looking more specifically at a smaller section of the country, the author’s home 
state of Wisconsin was examined. In 2005, the state of Wisconsin Department of Military 
Affairs issued “A Review of Wisconsin’s Emergency Preparedness Plans,” which 
identified strengths and weaknesses in the state’s emergency preparedness and response 
capabilities (WOJA, 2008, p. 4). The report identified the need for stronger mutual aid on 
a regional and statewide basis and discussed the barriers that Wisconsin has experienced 
in implementing NIMS and some of the solutions in progress to address them. It 
identified the main challenge as confusion regarding the requirements for NIMS (WOJA, 
2008, p. 5). Even the state of Wisconsin recognized that, given the amount of time 
necessary to fully implement NIMS requirements, additional funding and additional 
personnel are needed to monitor and administer current and future NIMS requirements 
(WOJA, 2008, p.9). The state recognizes this need; the smaller units of government will 
certainly have the same needs as well. This document was more political and tempered in 
its assessments than necessary and does not attempt to give an accurate picture of local 
preparedness.  
In 2005, in response to the mandates required in the annual objectives in NIMS, 
and to further the development and implementation of NIMS compliant strategies and 
preparedness policies and protocols, the Waukesha County NIMS Working Group 
(WCNWG) in southeastern Wisconsin was formed. This voluntary effort to build a 
network of emergency management, public health, public works, transportation, 
communications, law enforcement, and fire service leaders was needed to ensure a 
consistent, NIMS-compliant approach to preparedness strategies regardless of the hazard, 
threat, or discipline. The goal is to create a collaborative network that will move 
preparedness throughout the county from the concept stage to direct action.  
The WCNWG consists of 58 different agency leaders from across the county from 
every public sector discipline, most jurisdictions, and public safety or public works 
agencies. They all share the same vision of a collaborative network not only to meet 
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NIMS standards and follow the tenets of NIMS, but to gain a greater capability to 
respond to and recover from terrorist events or man-made or natural disasters or events. It 
was mutually agreed that all information gained, developed, or written would be shared 
with the entire group and all of their agencies. The literature on this effort consists of a 
county-wide common communications plan, an implementation plan, and an incident 
action planning process, as well as a mission statement and objectives. These documents 
and this system are an excellent example of a possible solution to the problems 
confronting small jurisdictions attempting to meet NIMS requirements.  
4. Academia and Subject-Matter Expert Analysis 
This subsection explores the central theme of collaboration between the federal, 
state, and local levels of government. Partly as fallout from the lack of preparedness and 
the uncoordinated emergency response to the disastrous events on September 11, 2001, 
the federal government reacted quickly by enacting sweeping changes to increase the 
nation’s preparedness capabilities. Academia and subject-matter experts followed soon 
after with analysis of the failures before 9/11 and the problems found in upgrading 
preparedness after it. Dr. Sam Clovis noted in his 2006 Homeland Security Affairs article 
on federalism that these changes were the “largest reorganization efforts since the passing 
of the National Security Act of 1947. In a single piece of legislation, twenty-two separate 
organizations were brought together to form the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). Given the depth of the changes envisioned, the time allotted for professional 
comment and the short debate, the resulting policies were disjointed and sometimes ill 
conceived” (Clovis, 2006a, p.1). This literature focuses on the role of the federal 
government in relation to preparedness in state and substate jurisdictions and the federal 
homeland security public policy environment and its impact on local preparedness 
efforts, specifically, the need for “coercive federalism” (Clovis, 2006a, p. 10).  
In his paper “Applying Contemporary IGM Models to Emergency Management,” 
Clovis describes the relationship of the federal government to local entities. He speaks of 
the theory of coercive federalism and its antithesis to cooperative federalism. In 
cooperative federalism no level of government may coerce any other to action, and the 
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Congress may act in facilitation and leadership roles only (Clovis, 2006b, p. 7). Under the 
tenets of coercive federalism, the federal government looks to nationalize issues and gain 
compliance to federal standards through the use of federal grant funding with stronger 
and tighter conditions and more preemption of state prerogatives (Clovis, 2006b, p. 8). 
Competitive federalism is characterized by the decentralization of power to that level 
where the tax base equals the geography of services provided, leading to the most 
efficient use of resources in the public domain (the principle of subsidiary) as state and 
local governments are closest to the people (Clovis, 2006b, p. 8). Clovis presents a new 
compound theory of federalism that he calls “collaborative federalism.” He believes that 
because of the systemic problems of the current model being used by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the answer lies in a new “spirit of collaboration, which 
incorporates the positive notion of cooperation, eliminates most of the negative aspects of 
coercion, and takes advantage of organizational models which encourage competitive 
spirits while building aggregate capabilities.” (Clovis, 2006b, p. 17). This paper presents 
an alternative approach for ensuring NIMS compliance and understanding the models 
available.  
In another paper, “Building Collaborative Capacity,” Susan Hocevar and Gail 
Thomas of the Naval Postgraduate School explore success factors in developing 
interagency collaboration. They assert that the establishment of a collaborative 
environment may require the selection of individuals or leaders who utilize the team 
approach to problem solving. They offer reasonable solutions to one part of a 
multifaceted problem (Hocevar & Thomas, 2006, p. 14).  
In the study “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS” 
the authors contend that the Incident Command System and NIMS do not create a 
universally acceptable system for responders; rather this is a mechanism designed to 
impose order on certain dimensions of the chaotic organizational environments of 
disasters (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006, p. 4). The report concludes that current efforts 
of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to use ICS will probably not 
succeed. The reasons are varied but concentrate on a lack of understanding and applied 
knowledge of the systems during large-scale disasters engendering major agency 
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responses. If this is the case for large disasters utilizing major response assets, it can 
certainly be extrapolated that small agencies in rural areas will find the challenges even 
greater, given their limited resources and manpower.  
5. After-Action Reports  
The Lesson Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) website is a clearinghouse 
of after-action reports (AAR) and lessons learned from exercises, events, incidents, and 
disasters across all disciplines, all hazards, and all levels of government. It is the national 
network of best practices for emergency-response personnel and homeland security 
officials (USDHS, FEMA, n.d.1). It is designed to facilitate preparedness efforts across 
all disciplines and communities, regardless of their size or location. This website is one of 
the most beneficial sources of first-hand anecdotal information on the success or failure 
of NIMS at all levels of government. Many different events, incidents, and disasters are 
documented, and each offers a first-hand description of how the responders succeeded or 
failed, in the real world, in meeting NIMS standards. The scope of the event and the size 
and location of the jurisdiction handling it provide relevant information about the 
struggles that smaller jurisdictions face during these incidents. All hazards and all 
disciplines are included in the after-action reports, which readily demonstrate the 
problems faced when jurisdictions do not follow NIMS tenets.  
6. Literature Review Conclusion 
In summary, the literature identified provides an unbalanced perspective, with the 
federal government providing the most relevant information and local literature the least 
information on the issue. More research needs to be conducted in order to better 
understand just how local units of government can meet NIMS requirements. Although 
the federal publications, orders, and other official guidance documents continue to 
evolve, they provide only an outflow of information. The literature on this topic in 
academia is very spotty and lacks direct applicability to the problems facing small and 
rural jurisdictions in meeting NIMS standards. 
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The literature also falls short in clarifying the problems and developing future 
solutions. The literature on this topic is not timely due to the continued evolution of the 
NIMS system. Much remains unknown about the extent to which the smallest units of 
government—towns, villages, small cities and counties in less populated areas of the 
country—are meeting national preparedness standards and objectives as defined by 
NIMS. Currently only states are required to report on NIMS compliance to the DHS, and 
some of them require counties to report only if they are compliant. Many local 
governmental entities are not mandated to report any of their efforts, successes or 
failures.  
The usefulness and validity of these literary sources varies; however, the first-
hand accounts described in the LLIS website and the National Emergency Management 
Association survey appear to be most meaningful and perspicacious.  
H. HYPOTHESES OR TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
In order for the smallest units of government—unincorporated towns, villages, 
and rural counties in the least populated areas of the country—to successfully meet 
national preparedness, response, recovery, and interoperability goals as expected in the 
National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG), they must adhere to the compliance metrics of 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (White House, 2003, p. 3).  The 
hypothesis is that efforts by small towns and rural areas to meet compliance standards in 
the five components of NIMS have been problematic (USDHS, 2007b). Some units of 
government in the state of Wisconsin are not meeting these requirements and are 
therefore not able to quickly and effectively respond to and recover from major disasters 
or catastrophes or coordinate with outside resources or agencies.  
It is critical that these units of government train and exercise to meet these 
requirements because they must have the ability to seamlessly integrate with other 
response entities when requested under mutual aid and to accept mutual aid when they 
have the need. The National Emergency Response structure, of which NIMS is an 
integral part, is built around the concept that all units of government and all disciplines, 
from the federal to the local level, must not only understand their role in managing an 
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event but have the ability to interoperate with each other to successfully manage the 
incident. The research examines why some small towns and rural areas are not able to 
meet these preparedness standards and determines whether it is because of inadequate 
resources, time, and funding. The research findings drive the proposed solution.  
NIMS establishes preparedness standards for the federal government, the states, 
tribes, and all local jurisdictions (USDHS, FEMA, 2008b) as a whole and as individual 
entities, no matter their size or location. These standards support five major components 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2008b, p. 7):  
1. Preparedness;  
2. Communications and information management;  
3. Resource management;  
4. Command and management; and  
5. Ongoing management and maintenance. 
The NPG helps to focus policy, planning, and investments at all levels of 
government and the private sector (Chertoff, 2007). The guidelines are meant to 
strengthen collective capabilities and prepare all jurisdictions for major incidents or 
disasters. There are four critical elements to the National Preparedness Guidelines 
(USDHS, 2007b): 
1. The national preparedness vision; 
2. The fifteen national planning scenarios; 
3. Universal task list (UTL) 
4. Target capabilities list (TCL).  
There is evidence that some small towns and rural areas are not meeting the 
standards: first hand accounts described in the LLIS website, the National Emergency 
Management Association survey on state responses and barriers to NIMS compliance, 
and the Wisconsin E-Sponder summary statistics for 2009. Literature detailing the 
consequences of noncompliance for small towns and rural areas is documented in after-
action reports (AAR). Parallel and historical efforts (national, regional, and state levels) 
give perspective on the development of these types of systems and their significance and 
22  
provide an opportunity to learn from past successes and failures. Federal publications 
detailing the requirements, state and local efforts at meeting those requirements, 
academia, and subject-matter expert analysis on compliance also give evidence bolstering 
this claim. 
The research shows that small towns and rural areas are not able or willing to 
meet the standards as required by NIMS. The proposed solution is a detailed, scaled, 
regional approach to preparedness for the less densely populated counties, cities, villages, 
and townships in the country. It is impractical to expect smaller municipal forms of 
government with small public safety agencies and budgets, some of them volunteers or 
part-timers, to adopt and utilize large-scale preparedness and response structures meant 
for hundreds or thousands of responders. Developing regional preparedness capabilities 
through collaboration and regional meta-leadership teams with representatives from all 
disciplines and most jurisdictions may have the greatest probability of positively 
affecting groups of entities within a region. The trickle-down preparedness effect from 
these teams on their home agencies and jurisdictions will bring the country closer to the 
desired end-state of a truly prepared nation.  
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II. METHOD 
Case studies, interviews, and qualitative analysis were conducted for this 
research. These methods were chosen because of the lack of prior academic research 
directly applicable to this topic, the lack of quantitative data available, and the 
importance of identifying the causal process. These methods seek to gain an objective 
understanding of the problem and a sound basis for drawing conclusions and making 
recommendations for solutions. The state of Wisconsin was the primary geographic area 
for the research due to its diversity of population centers (rural, urban, small, and large) 
and availability of information to the researcher.  
Research Question #1: How do asymmetries in NIMS adoption impact inter-
local cooperation in times of crisis? 
Method: Case studies. 
Two cases were examined that:  
 Occurred in the past six years. 
 Involved both large and small jurisdictions working together in a large-
scale disaster. 
 Involved event impacts that crossed jurisdictional boundaries. 
 Were critically analyzed through the after-action review (AAR) process, 
and 
 Have suggested corrective actions that can be taken to resolve the issues 
that were identified. 
A. CASE STUDIES 
For each case that was studied, after-action reports and commentary were 
examined to provide the basis of study. The analysis identified patterns, variables, causes, 
and correlative factors from the failures related to the ability of the responders to use all 
components of NIMS related to preparedness and response. The research did not examine 
training records or plans for the agencies involved but instead focused on their response 
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only. Preparedness was judged based upon performance during the study of the incident.  
Focus was placed on the ability of small and rural communities to effectively interoperate 
with and incorporate assistance from other jurisdictions using the methods and 
requirements in NIMS. 
A list of questions was developed to provide structure and focus to the research 
revolving around adoption and institutionalization of the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). Each case was organized to answer the first research question. In the 
final chapter, a comparative analysis was conducted, looking for themes across the cases 
and drawing conclusions from them.  
Case Study Focus Questions 
1) Did the actions of the response organizations indicate that they 
preplanned, trained, and exercised for the event that occurred? 
2) Did the response organizations have the capacity to interoperate 
successfully in a crisis environment? 
3) Did the entities involved in the response to the emergency institutionalize 
the use of the Incident Command System? 
4) Did all response entities and structures successfully utilize NIMS-
compliant public information systems and protocols?  
5) Did all response entities display a mutual ability to utilize the incident 
action planning process? 
These case studies were examined by comparing 11 of the NIMS implementation 
objectives related to response, including the requirement to manage all incidents and 
planned events in accordance with ICS organizational structures, doctrine, and 
procedures to after-action reports from the field that the objectives were designed to 
facilitate. These objectives clearly require the incorporation of NIMS concepts and 
principles into all appropriate state, territorial, and tribal training and exercises to ensure 
easy adoption during actual events (USDHS, FEMA, 2009d, #16). This study compared 
the NIMS standards against actual facts from these events to observe how their 
inconsistent application affected multiagency responses. All agencies involved in these 
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case studies knew that, since 2004, NIMS required that ICS implementation must include 
the consistent application of incident action planning (IAP), common communications 
plans, and the implementation of unified command (UC) in multi-jurisdictional or 
multiagency incident management (USDHS, FEMA, 2009d, #25).  
Research Question #2: For those small and rural jurisdictions that are not 
meeting the standards and objectives as defined by NIMS, what are the reasons? 
Method: Conduct interviews and compare responses to the expectations in the 
NIMS objectives. 
B. INTERVIEWS 
The interview methodology was designed to assist in answering the second 
research question: “For those small and rural jurisdictions that are not meeting the 
standards and objectives as defined by NIMS, what are the reasons?” To answer that 
question confidential interviews of informed professionals in the target demographic 
were conducted, in order to catalog and compare their responses to the federal NIMS 
requirements. 
Interviews were conducted of selected county-level emergency managers (EM) 
from Wisconsin counties that have mainly small or rural jurisdictions. These EM’s were 
selected because of their experience with small jurisdictions that may not be utilizing or 
following the tenets of NIMS. They were also selected based upon the demographic and 
geographic locations of their counties in Wisconsin. An attempt was made to interview 
disparately located counties so as not gather too much information from one area of the 
state. Another criteria for selection was each county’s involvement in other preparedness 
activities, such as Wisconsin’s virtual Emergency Operations Center (EOC) called E-
sponder (see Appendix B). These counties were tracked in Wisconsin E-Sponder and 
found to be minimally involved, compared to other larger or more urban areas. These 
anonymous and confidential interviews were focused on examining the reasons why 
these jurisdictions have not followed these standards.  
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The voluntary participants in the interviews were asked specific questions in an 
attempt to answer the second research question. They were interviewed for about an hour 
each and were asked open-ended questions in order to flesh out the pertinent factors 
involved in NIMS compliance. The data collected were analyzed quantitatively to 
identify themes. Specific questions were asked: 
1. How would you describe the current status of NIMS implementation or 
adoption in small and rural communities in your county (law 
enforcement/fire /EMS/public health, public works/emergency 
management)? 
2. What are the factors either impeding or facilitating NIMS adoption? 
3. What are the different levels of preparedness in the various communities 
in your county? 
4. Do these differences affect or impact the ability to respond to interagency 
emergencies where resources are pulled in from a wide area? 
5. If so, what problems have you seen or observed that affected 
multijurisdictional emergency response to large disasters? 
6. Would law enforcement, fire, EMS, public health, public works, or 
emergency management personnel in your county have the necessary 
knowledge to be able to deploy to other areas and the state and 
successfully interoperate in a NIMS-compliant environment?  
7. What potential solutions to these problems might you offer, based upon 
your experiences, that would be of assistance? 
The data collected was analyzed qualitatively to identify themes. The following 
items were coded in the analysis of the transcripts: 
1. Knowledge of the requirements of NIMS; 
2. Perception of the need to follow NIMS; 
3. Degree of NIMS compliance; 
4. Incentives or disincentives to meet the national preparedness goal; 
5. Roadblocks to meeting the national preparedness goal; and 
6. Solutions to upgrade rural preparedness. 
 Research Question #3: If there are impacts to interlocal cooperation due to 
asymmetric NIMS adoption, what are the systemic and long-term solutions? 
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Method: Identify problems; leverage findings from literature review, case 
studies, interviews, and examination of existing systems to develop solutions. 
C. ANALYSIS 
An analysis was conducted of the findings from the case studies, literature review, 
and interviews. Successful systems in Wisconsin that currently utilize the tenets of NIMS 
were also examined as to how they have been used to organize small or rural jurisdictions 
to meet the national preparedness goal. These interagency systems were deemed 
successful over time and through field experience in responding to disasters and major 
incidents, utilizing resources from the target demographic. These similar systems and 
attendant literature include the fire service’s Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) of 
Wisconsin and Illinois and the Waukesha County NIMS Working Group of southeastern 
Wisconsin. 
The analysis of similar successful systems that have been used to organize 
national preparedness also assists in fleshing out potential solutions. The process that was 
used can be summarized in the following steps: 
1. Close reading of the data;  
2. Identification of initial segments of data or codes;  
3. Development of coherent, consistent, and distinctive themes;  
4. Creation of a thematic map; and 
5. Writing up of the analysis. 
A strategy canvas was developed for implementation of the new rural 
preparedness doctrine for DHS in answer to the third research question.  A strategy 
canvas is used as the main tool in Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 25) 
and is designed to plot the difference between the old method and the new method. The 
canvas is a subjective interpretation of facts learned in the research and their definition. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
These cases were selected because each represents a different point in time (four 
years apart) and a different demographic; a congested urban area and a small-town rural 
area. Both contain examples of how the asymmetries in NIMS adoption impacted 
interlocal cooperation in times of crisis. The 2009 fire case study occurred after four 
years of lessons learned from disasters across the country and a multitude of steps taken 
to fully implement NIMS.  
A. CASE STUDY # 1—GRANITEVILLE TRAIN DERAILMENT 
The Graniteville train derailment was chosen because it is an example from five 
years ago that illustrates how asymmetries in NIMS adoption actually impacted inter-
local cooperation. This is directly linked to the first research question: whether 
asymmetries in NIMS adoption impact interlocal cooperation in times of crisis. On 
January 6, 2005, in the early morning hours, the unincorporated community of 
Graniteville, South Carolina (population of about 7,000) was shaken awake when one 
train collided with a parked train that was carrying toxic chemicals, including chlorine 
gas, sodium hydroxide, and cresol. The crash between the moving train and the parked 
train derailed both trains’ locomotives, as well as 18 freight cars. Four hazardous 
materials tank cars derailed, three containing chlorine and one containing sodium 
hydroxide. One tank car loaded with chlorine gas ruptured, sending more than 40 tons of 
lethal gas into the air and causing the deaths of nine people. Another 250 people required 
treatment for chlorine exposure. A large-scale evacuation of over 1,400 homes was 
ordered for the surrounding area, moving more than 5,000 residents out of harm’s way 
for more than two weeks (Transportation Research Record, 2007, p. 130).  
1. Background 
The disaster engendered a massive intergovernmental, multidiscipline response 
including local, state, regional, and federal elements to mitigate the problem, including 
fire service hazardous materials teams, search and rescue, emergency management, 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and forensic investigation by law enforcement. 
Local aid was summoned from rural and small-town fire and law enforcement agencies 
from around the region, requiring them to communicate, interoperate and be accountable 
to the tenets of NIMS. The local fire department and its hazmat team were staffed by 
volunteers with little practical knowledge or proclivity to use NIMS-compliant practices 
and procedures. The fire chief, who worked for the same railroad involved in the disaster, 
also headed the local fire department. Some state and federal agencies immediately 
attempted to use the Incident Command System (ICS) but ran into trouble when trying to 
work with smaller agencies that did not.  
Graniteville lost lives, jobs, infrastructure, time, and resources in the aftermath of 
the train wreck. The chlorine gas corroded everything it touched. It damaged wiring, 
paint, and plastics in buildings, ruined all electronics it touched, and killed trees, plants, 
shrubbery, birds, and insects. For months, the town was silent with no signs of nature. 
2. Findings 
First responders from the local volunteer fire department and police department 
initially reacted by driving into the hot zone without donning personal protective gear. 
The Department of Homeland Security had earlier supplied, through grants, complete 
Level C personal protective equipment (PPE) to protect against just such a threat, but 
local responders had not completed required fit-testing before the disaster struck. This 
lack of preplanning, training, and exercising, as required by NIMS, resulted in the 
compromised health and safety of those personnel whose purpose was to help the injured 
when the chlorine blistered in their lungs. Command and control was ineffective, as was 
noted in the evacuation, when no clear instructions were given to those civilians 
evacuating the area. When they tried to drive away, many of their car engines would not 
start due to the effect of the chlorine gas (Brittle, n.d., points 1–7). 
Effective communication, a major requirement of NIMS, was severely hampered 
during the incident due to a lack of training, exercising systems, and NIMS-compliant 
processes. Cell phones would not work because of the effect of combined humidity and 
chlorine gas on the electronics. Radio interoperability was a problem due to a lack of 
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common operating frequencies and channels. Multiple levels of communication had not 
been pre-established, as required by the NIMS common communications plan. The 
community had a reverse 911 system, but the database was out of date. It was not used 
initially because trained personnel could not be reached to operate it. When the system 
was initially utilized, the message given was to shelter in place, which caused more 
injuries. It was used again later to evacuate the same areas (Brittle, n.d., points 8–13). 
Another after-action report on this incident, Train Wreck and Chlorine Spill in 
Graniteville, South Carolina: Transportation Effects and Lessons in Small-Town 
Capacity for No-Notice Evacuation, recognized that the type of chaos experienced in 
Graniteville is not unusual, given the responders’ lack of training or exercising in NIMS-
compliant ICS. This failure engenders a multitude of problems when attempting to 
interoperate with agencies that do follow NIMS since they are working under incongruent 
processes. Poor communication between the responding agencies and their lack of clear 
decision-making authority exacerbated this disaster. The local volunteer fire chief was the 
initial incident commander and approached within 1000 feet of the crash site without 
PPE. Because of a lack of preparedness planning, responders disagreed over how to 
evacuate the town. This disagreement resulted in inaction and then the wrong actions. As 
stated above, the reverse 911 system worked, but the timing and decision making of the 
evacuation actions rendered the system only marginally effective because of ineffective 
command and control. Responders also could not quickly and positively identify the 
hazardous material or the proper response procedure, due to a lack of the preparedness 
required by NIMS (Dunning & Oswalt, 2007, p. 131). 
Objective # 20 on the FY 2009 NIMS implementation objectives chart—titled 
“communications”—clearly states that all agencies must utilize systems, tools, and 
processes to give accurate information, resulting in a common operating picture during an 
incident or planned event. Agencies involved in the Graniteville disaster did not meet this 
requirement: as callers reported people dying, 911 could do nothing but advise callers to 
stay inside. In the most extreme example, one mill worker stayed on hold with a 911 
operator for 28 minutes. The operator advised him to stay inside and wait for help while 
the caller labored to breathe and screamed in agony. After those 28 minutes, the call was 
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disconnected. The caller followed instructions and waited for help in the mill for four 
hours before he dragged himself out of the plant and drove himself to evacuate. 
Automated reverse 911 called people and advised them to stay in their homes and turn off 
their air circulation; however, this system did not start until four hours after the incident. 
Callers reported that they were stuck where they could not walk either way because they 
would “choke to death.” The 911 operator advised them to “go indoors.” (Transportation 
Research Record, 2007, p. 132). 
This same lack of situational awareness, a common operating picture, and critical 
information by the emergency dispatchers, resulting in the deaths of victims, was also 
found on 9/11 in New York City almost four years earlier. Victims inside the twin towers 
were also instructed by dispatchers to shelter in place and wait for help to come to them, 
only to later die (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
[National Commission], 2004, p. 295). 
The Graniteville-Vaucluse-Warrenville volunteer fire department’s own after-
action report of the incident indicates that there were major problems due to asymmetries 
in NIMS adoption and utilization that impacted inter-local cooperation. One of the 
keystones of NIMS is the institutionalization and use of the Incident Command System. 
The after-action report states that the Incident Command System (ICS) process was not 
followed by all responding agencies, leading to a lack of coordination between the 
various volunteer fire departments and emergency medical system responders from 
around the region during the initial incident response. Some of the EMS units responding 
from around the region drove directly into the hot zone, not following standard ICS 
command and control protocols. No initial staging areas or safe routes of ingress and 
egress were established (Graniteville-Vaucluse-Warrenville Fire Department [GVWFD], 
2006, Objective 3, Criteria 4). 
For this case study we compared 2009 NIMS standards against this earlier 
incident. The purpose was not to write a new after-action report for the event but to 
examine how following the latest NIMS standards might have changed or impacted the 
outcome. FY2009 NIMS implementation objective #8 requires the development of 
interagency mutual aid and assistance agreements (United States Department of 
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Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency [USDHS, FEMA, 2009b). 
This disaster brought to light the fact that no formal mutual aid agreements existed 
between Aiken County and Richmond County, the county adjacent to the site of the 
disaster. Such a lack directly affected inter-local cooperation during this major incident 
when assets were pulled from multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions and placed in 
harm’s way. Some first responders incurred severe medical problems from exposure to 
the chlorine gas, leading to workers’ compensation claims. Some equipment, trucks, turn-
out gear, and ambulances were also damaged due to the corrosive effects of the gas. 
Without formal mutual aid agreements in place, the liability for both the workers and the 
equipment claims was significant (GVWFD, 2006, Objective 3, Criteria 5). 
GVWFD personnel displayed a lack of knowledge of the county emergency 
operations plans and procedures, resulting in a lack of coordination between agencies and 
levels of government. Entry teams from other agencies did not coordinate their actions 
with the fire department’s incident commander during the early hours of incident. Buses 
used for the transport of evacuees were also not coordinated with incident command. A 
lack of preparedness, planning, training, and exercising ICS resulted in a lack of 
integration of law enforcement and EMS personnel into the fire department’s incident 
command system. Initial fire department accountability was weak during the first 30 
minutes, due to response from multiple locations by multiple jurisdictions. Lack of proper 
credentials caused some problems with the movement of volunteer responders. The 
county produced generic badges with names but no photos, resulting in no method for 
authentication (GVWFD, 2006, Objective 3, Criteria 5). 
Had those local agencies adopted and integrated NIMS into their processes, they 
would not have had the credentialing problems they subsequently experienced. NIMS 
implementation objective #24 requires agencies to initiate the development of a 
state/territory/tribal-wide system (that incorporates local jurisdictions) to credential 
emergency management and response personnel in order to ensure proper authorization 
and access to an incident, including those involving mutual aid agreements or assistance 
agreements.  
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The Aiken County government’s after-action report points out many of the same 
deficiencies noted in other reports of this disaster. (Aiken County South Carolina 
[ACSC], 2005, objectives 1–7, pp. 1–13) The NIMS requirements for preplanning, 
training, and exercising plans before an incident directly impacted this event. The AAR 
recommends in its conclusions that joint training between EOC personnel and command 
post responders is needed, as is required by NIMS (USDHS, 2009b, objective #16–18). 
Agencies need to understand each other’s roles and capabilities preincident, in order to 
adequately respond to crisis. Many of those points that could have been mitigated and 
worked out prior to this derailment—points that are directly related to answering the first 
research question—are examined further here. 
The safety of first responders was an issue. The first Aiken County EMS 
(ACEMS) units responded directly to the scene and had to leave the area due to fumes. 
Entry should have been coordinated with the incident commander. The safety officer was 
not designated for EMS operations. The safety officer’s responsibilities defaulted to the 
ACEMS shift manager. These issues would have been averted had the basic principals of 
ICS been followed: the designation of a safety officer, who establishes safe avenues of 
approach and hot zones, is one of the first items addressed when arriving on the scene 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2009b, objective #25). EMS entry into the hot zone was coordinated 
through Aiken County sheriff’s dispatch, who contacted the EMS supervisor at USCA. 
There was no coordination with GVWFD. ACEMS access was restricted after first entry 
because of lack of PPE availability and incomplete fit testing on equipment received from 
the Department of Homeland Security. The accountability system (hazmat wristbands) 
implemented by the fire department was not communicated to all responding agencies. 
Responding EOC staff were not provided with specific safe routes of travel. ACEMD 
should consider adding safe route determination to EOC procedures. ACEMS attempted 
to medically monitor other responders, but they were entering the incident area without 
EMS coordination. Triage tags were not utilized, although they were available; this 
resulted in a lack of accountability for injured victims. The on-duty EMS supervisor must 
relinquish control of outside incidents and focus on the major incident at hand.  
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Communications with the public and between responders was an issue. The 
reverse 911 system was not activated in a timely manner because access was available 
only by emergency management personnel. The system should have been activated 
through direction from the dispatch supervisor and by authorization from the incident 
commander. The reverse 911 database used to initiate public calls was five years old, and 
the public was unaware that unlisted phone numbers are not listed on 911 call lists, 
resulting in no communications to a large segment of the community. No procedure to 
confirm dissemination of public protective action notifications was in place at the time of 
the disaster. The Web EOC communication and tracking system was not utilized due to 
the time-consuming effort to set up basic needs in EOC (ACSC, 2005, objectives 1–7, pp.  
1–13). 
The Aiken County Emergency Department had to contact the South Carolina 
Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) to initiate the emergency alerting system 
(EAS), which only works if the radio station is in auto position. ACEMD did not have 
EAS monitoring capability to determine whether the EAS message had been transmitted 
to citizens. Federal Environmental Protection Agency personnel were initially unaware 
that the Aiken County EOC was operational. Unmanned radio stations possessed limited 
ability to broadcast local emergency alerts. Initial notification did not go out through the 
NOAA weather radio, although that system was utilized later in the day. Not all ACEMS 
personnel had county-issued pagers, and there was no process in place for callback other 
than a landline, which resulted in response by approximately 25% of key personnel.  
The mass-casualty plan was not implemented initially due to communication 
difficulties. Citizens in shelters had no official information source. 211, the Aiken County 
help line, received calls immediately but initially had no information to provide. 211 
received updated information via television news report. As a result, 211 personnel did 
not learn key information, such as the shelter-in-place message that had been transmitted 
to residents. Nor was 211 accessible via cell phone. Additional numbers needed to be 
provided and entered into the database. The EOC was receiving updated information via 
television news reports, not from the command post (CP). The EOC did not have press 
releases prior to distribution at CP. Hard copies of press releases were not initially 
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distributed at press conferences. The EOC public information officer (PIO) could not get 
a response from the PIOs at CP to coordinate messages for the media at the EOC.  
Command and control was another issue that came to light during the event. The 
credibility of the EOC was hampered by the lack of a dedicated, adequate facility. The 
lack of coordination between the EOC and the CP affected logistics, food deliveries, and 
housing, for example, and caused the duplication of effort because information was not 
being shared effectively. Formal status briefings needed to be conducted for EOC staff on 
a regular basis. The ACEMS supervisor was not present at the initial command post. The 
local and national Red Cross points of contact were needed at the CP to coordinate food 
for personnel in outlying areas. The national Red Cross position was also needed in the 
EOC.  
The coordination of logistics and outside resources was compromised due to the 
failure to follow NIMS tenets (USDHS, FEMA, 2009b, objective #26). Aiken County 
Geographic Information Services (GIS) resources were not involved in the unified 
command post planning meetings. ACEMS observed additional EMS support arrive from 
outside Aiken County, but the additional units were not coordinated with ACEMS. A 
great numbers of individuals at the CP had no reason to be there. Better identification of 
key command staff would have helped. Shelter staffing issues arose when a shelter was 
opened without EOC coordination or the knowledge of the Department of Social Services 
(DSS) or the Red Cross, even though there is potential county liability and financial 
responsibility if the Red Cross has not been involved with shelter opening. A 
predetermined accountability system was needed for Aiken County emergency response 
agencies. Agency accountability was maintained but was not being shared with other 
agencies. Communication of patient status at decontamination was not well coordinated 
with Red Cross shelter representatives. Persons at shelters were registered, but if they 
were sent to the hospital or left with friends or family, their status was unknown. Field 
charging capabilities were also needed for portable radios and cell phone batteries.  
Recovery and post-event actions were also examined and it was found that no 
support agencies (Salvation Army, Red Cross, DSS, for example) were kept informed of 
recovery status. Although daily status meetings were held at the UCP, the information 
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was not communicated with the EOC. After-action reviews noted that pre-event 
coordination of consistent GIS data was needed. The media staging area was located too 
close to CP, resulting in a lack of separation between functions. To summarize the 
findings from this case study: 
1) Scene control was compromised, putting responders in danger; 
2) There was no preplanning or training in DHS-supplied PPE; 
3) Command and control was an issue due to a lack of ICS knowledge; 
4) Communication was an issue due to a lack of planning and training, 
resulting in the lack of a common operating picture among responders, the 
EOC, and the communications center;  
5) Situational awareness was not widespread among agencies and dispatch; 
6) The lack of EOC–ICS interface knowledge led to a lack of resource 
coordination; 
7) Public-information coordination and joint-information protocols were not 
used, causing confusion in the public. 
3. Analysis 
The EPA’s after-action report accurately summed up the main points of the many 
AARs completed on this event. First responders were generally unfamiliar with the 
application of NIMS unified command or incident command (ICS) principles for use 
during major incidents, including the incident action planning process. Responders to this 
disaster lacked an understanding of the chain of command principles utilized in ICS. 
Early operations lacked unified command objectives as required by NIMS under the ICS 
principal of management by objectives. There was a general lack of coordination and 
information sharing during the response and recovery phases of the incident. One of the 
major components of NIMS is communications and information management, the failure 
of which in Graniteville was recognized by the after-action report that stated,  “The need 
for information and communication cannot be overstated” (Transportation Research 
Record, 2007, p. 132). 
The different agencies represented in the unified command did not share a 
common workspace and instead hunkered down in their own mobile command posts. 
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This is a common problem in all major incidents that is exacerbated by a lack of training, 
knowledge, and institutionalization of NIMS through training and exercises of plans.  
Most of the issues encountered during the response and recovery to this event 
could have been addressed prior to the event had the local agencies conducted prior 
planning, training, and exercising and had they initiated corrective-action plans based on 
what they learned. Had they followed this well-established principle of NIMS, the loss of 
life, damage to property, and injury to personnel may have been lessened. The NIMS 
objective of preparedness that directly relates to this disaster and the asymmetries that 
were caused by agencies not following NIMS is found in NIMS documents, which 
require jurisdictions to incorporate NIMS concepts and principles into all appropriate 
state, territorial, and tribal training and exercises and to plan for and participate in an all-
hazards exercise program, including the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation 
Program, that involves emergency management and response personnel from multiple 
disciplines and multiple jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are to also incorporate corrective 
actions into preparedness and response plans and procedures (USDHS, FEMA, 2009c, 
pp. 16–18). 
According to NIMS Alert 008-05, issued by the NIMS Integration Center on 
August 17, 2005, “The requirement to adopt and implement NIMS and ICS means NIMS 
and ICS for incident management every day. Those who don’t are not NIMS compliant” 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2005b). To their credit, the Graniteville-Vaucluse-Warrenville Fire 
Department recognized, after this event, that ICS must be institutionalized into everyday 
use and that multiple agency response drills would be beneficial to future responses 
(GVWFD, 2006, objective 8).  
B. CASE STUDY # 2—PATRICK CUDAHY PLANT FIRE 
The first research question in this thesis was to examine whether asymmetries in 
NIMS adoption impact inter-local cooperation in times of crisis. The Patrick Cudahy 
plant fire was chosen because it is a recent example of how compliance with NIMS, as 
well as asymmetries in NIMS adoption, actually impacted inter-local cooperation in times 
of crisis. One telltale indicator of NIMS adoption by an agency is the effective use of all 
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aspects of the incident command system (ICS) during a crisis. Dozens of agencies and 
multiple disciplines were involved in this response over a number of days, with varying 
levels of utilization and implementation of ICS and the other tenets of NIMS. These 
varying levels were also examined. This is the precise scenario that NIMS was designed 
and built to help facilitate. Some agencies and disciplines had made a conscious effort to 
adopt NIMS before this incident and were well versed in its tenets, and some were not. 
This narrative addresses only those issues during this incident related to the theme of the 
research and directly tied to the research question above. Many positive attributes were 
realized during this event, including an effective deployment of MABUS and SMART 
resources. This narrative is not meant to minimize the heroic efforts of all the responders 
whose direct actions resulted in no loss of life and the saving of property from 
destruction; rather the purpose is to point out areas that others can learn from and use for 
future responses.  
1. Background 
On July 4–8, 2009, in the city of Cudahy, Wisconsin, one of the largest 
commercial fires in the state’s history engulfed the 121-year-old Patrick Cudahy meat 
packing plant that employs 1,800 workers. The city of Cudahy is a community of about 
19,000 residents, located just south of Milwaukee, in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, and 
is adjacent to Lake Michigan. A fourth of July fireworks prank went awry when a 
military parachute flare was fired into the air by a neighbor as part of the holiday 
celebration. The hot-burning flare landed on the roof, quickly burning through and into 
flammable sub-roof materials, setting the building on fire. The plant utilizes many 
chemicals and flammable liquids and gases for meat processing. The plant keeps 177,000 
pounds of anhydrous ammonia under pressure, according to the 2009 hazardous materials 
report filed with Milwaukee County emergency management. The plant also has some 
800,000 pounds of lard and 250,000 pounds of brown food grease stored in several 
buildings, all flammable (Held, 2009).  
Over 2,000 calls flooded the Cudahy communications center as residents called in 
for help and information. This incident quickly grew into a five-alarm fire, requiring 400 
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firefighting personnel and equipment from 64 different fire departments over the four-day 
period to keep up fire suppression efforts 24 hours a day. As the fire spread, additional 
materials began to burn as well, endangering surrounding residential neighborhoods. The 
threat of explosion from one ammonia tank turned critical as the fire approached. This 
necessitated a complete evacuation of a surrounding one-mile radius and the 
establishment of an emergency shelter in the South Milwaukee High School. A law 
enforcement level-8 Suburban Mutual Aid Response Team (SMART) call-up was 
ordered to handle perimeter and evacuation duties. This is the highest level of call-up 
under this system. Dozens of police officers from many jurisdictions, including small 
towns and rural areas, were called and worked this incident in support of the Cudahy 
Police Department. Many other disciplines also responded to assist in any way possible.  
Elderly and frail residents began showing up at the shelter, initially overwhelming 
aid workers assigned there, requiring assistance from medical personnel from the 
Milwaukee County Department on Aging. Health Departments and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) from surrounding areas sent staff to assist. The American Red 
Cross and the Salvation Army brought medications and bedding, as well as 
accommodations for pets. Transportation assistance was requested from the Milwaukee 
County Transit System to aid in the evacuation and movement of citizens away from the 
danger zone.  
2. Findings 
On July 23, 2009, an after-action review of the response to this incident was held 
and included representatives from all responding entities, public, private, and NGOs; it 
was facilitated by Milwaukee County Emergency Manager Carl Stenbol. Approximately 
75 people attended and gave comment on the pros and cons of the response to the event. 
The author attended, looking specifically for those strategic asymmetries in NIMS 
adoption that impacted inter-local cooperation during this four-day event. The examples 
detailed below were selected based the research in an attempt to examine and analyze 
their relationship to preparedness; these represent problems that resulted from lack of  
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continuity or asymmetries between entities during a major disaster. Many positive 
examples of collective cooperation and use of the ICS were evident throughout the 
response. The principals of NIMS worked.  
3. Fire Service Actions 
According to fire personnel who worked the fire, the operational periods during 
this incident were too long, resulting in on-scene fire personnel attempting to do too 
much for extended periods of time. NIMS specifically speaks to this point in its Incident 
Command System (ICS) 200-level training. The operational period is the period of time 
scheduled for execution of a given set of tactical actions, as specified in the Incident 
Action Plan (USDHS, FEMA, 2008a, pp. 3–20). The more complex the tasks being 
performed, the shorter should be the time periods. Over time, the operational periods 
become longer in duration as fewer critical tasks are being performed. The National 
Wildfire Coordinating Group defines operational periods as “the period of time scheduled 
for execution of a given set of operation actions as specified in the incident action plan. 
Operational periods can be of various lengths, although usually not over 24 hours” 
(National Wildfire Coordinating Group). In the Fire Service, operational periods should 
be established for 4, 6, or 12 hours in length, depending on the type and complexity of 
activity. In general, an operation period during escalating structural fire incidents should 
not exceed four hours (Daniels, 2006). The failure of the incident commander to follow 
these rules for the length of operational periods as required by NIMS led to key personnel 
being worked beyond their limits, as described by command during the after-action 
review. This could have led to compromised decision-making capabilities. 
A Type 3 incident management team (IMT) or incident command organization 
could have been summoned to the scene to assist the overworked local commanders. Two 
different IMTs from Wisconsin and Illinois offered their services to relieve the command 
team but were turned down for reasons that were not verbalized. These teams are trained 
to assist local agencies whose command resources are exhausted or overwhelmed. This 
concept is another key element in NIMS doctrine. The teams manage initial action 
incidents with a significant number of resources deployed during an extended attack 
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incident until containment/control is achieved (USDHS, FEMA, 2005c, pp. 1–5). 
Accountability, resource management, communications, and span of control would all 
have been addressed by these highly trained, NIMS-compliant personnel. 
The span of control for supervisory and command level officers was greater than 
what was practical to manage during the duration of this event. Some spans of control 
ranged in the dozens for just one supervisor, resulting in a lack of command and control 
over that many people. Maintaining effective span of control is important to efficient 
incident management because safety and accountability of personnel are priorities. 
Within ICS, the span of control of any individual with incident management supervisory 
responsibility should range from three to seven subordinates in order to maintain 
accountability during complex, high-threat situations. If a supervisor has fewer than three 
people reporting, or more than seven, some adjustment to the organization should be 
considered. Monitoring the span of control in the ICS organization is a major 
responsibility of the incident commander (USDHS, FEMA, 2008a, pp. 2–32). 
Supervisors must be able to adequately supervise and control their subordinates, as well 
as communicate with and manage all resources under their supervision (USDHS, FEMA, 
2005c, pp. 2–7). Failure to do so leads to accountability issues due to the large numbers 
of responders on-scene at any given time. 
Balancing the number of personnel on-scene with the number of units still needed 
was a difficult job during the fire. Some mutual-aid units were requested and sent to the 
staging area to wait for an assignment, and they then sat there for a considerable time. 
Most of these units responded as requested and left their home jurisdiction short staffed. 
Some jurisdictions may have incurred overtime due to this deployment to the fire scene; 
the presence of units sitting in staging for long periods of time is not an efficient use of 
resources. Some agencies utilized volunteer firefighters, who were required to be away 
from their normal jobs and families. Sitting in staging for long periods was not what they 
had volunteered for. The counter to waiting in staging too long was that some personnel 
and teams actively working the problem did not get into rehabilitation soon enough. This 
resulted in crews that were overworked and without adequate rest.  
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The above fire response issues revolve around a central tenet of NIMS: 
accountability and effective scene management. In the ICS, chain of command and unity 
of command provide the basis for effective resource management and personnel 
accountability (USDHS, FEMA, 2005c, p. 3). It was very difficult to achieve 
accountability during this multiagency, multijurisdictional response involving hundreds 
of personnel. Scene control also became an issue because of the scope of the area being 
cordoned off. Unauthorized vehicles entered the scene behind fire trucks while law 
enforcement personnel were being used for other priorities including evacuation.  
4. Communications and Resource Management 
Accountability became an issue for the dispatch center when it became 
overwhelmed initially and had to call in for mutual aid from the Telecommunicator’s 
Emergency Response Taskforce (TERT). The Red Cross was summoned but was 
confused as to its role in the incident. The local, level-one trauma center was not notified 
of the incident so that they could put their resources on standby in case of a mass casualty 
event. The regional hospital communication tool called the Wisconsin Tracking, 
Resources, Alerts and Communication (WITRAC) was not used to advise all hospitals in 
the region that a hospital in the danger zone might need to be evacuated or of the scope of 
the disaster so that those hospitals could prepare. The liaison officer needed much more 
assistance to manage the number of requests and actions taking place. 
The NIMS description of resource management includes processes for 
categorizing, ordering, dispatching, tracking, and recovering resources. It also includes 
processes for reimbursement for resources, as appropriate. Resources include personnel, 
teams, equipment, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment 
or allocation in support of incident management and emergency response activities 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2005c, pp. 2–6). NIMS provides for standardized mechanisms and 
establishes requirements for processes to describe, inventory, mobilize, dispatch, track, 
and recover resources over the life cycle of an incident (USDHS, FEMA, 2005c, pp. 2–
10). 
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Resource request communications between different elements working this 
incident were inadequate; many different people were requesting similar resources, 
resulting in multiple redundant requests for the same equipment and personnel. Many 
different elements, units, and agencies working the scene ordered their own resources by 
themselves. They did not use the single-point resource ordering process and did not 
effectively track resources requested. The concept of single-point resource ordering is 
that the burden of finding the requested resources is placed on the responsible 
jurisdiction/agency dispatch/ordering center and not on the incident organization 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2005c, pp. 6–19). In this case, however, the local dispatch/ordering 
center became overloaded with other activity and was unable to handle new requests in a 
timely manner. Assisting agencies at the incident also had their own policies that required 
their own resource orders to be made through their respective dispatch/ordering centers.  
In this case, multipoint ordering was utilized but without tracking and 
accountability. This resulted in resources being ordered from several different ordering 
points and/or the private sector. Multipoint off-incident resource ordering is very difficult 
to manage and should only be done when necessary because multipoint ordering places a 
heavier load on incident personnel by requiring them to place orders through two or more 
ordering points. This method of ordering also requires tremendous coordination between 
and among ordering points and increases the chances of lost or duplicated orders 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2005c, pp. 6–20). 
For example, during this fire many buses were requested multiple times for the 
same task by personnel unaware that others had already requested them. One of the 
basics of ICS is that resource requests must be communicated up the chain of command 
and as the incident organization grows to meet the needs of the incident. Care must be 
taken to ensure that information transfer is handled effectively. This formal 
communication during an incident requires that orders, directives, resource requests, and 
status changes must follow the hierarchy of command unless otherwise directed 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2005c, pp. 2–17). The ICS position that could have been utilized to 
handle resource management would have been the resource unit leader in the planning 
section.  
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Due to the issues described above, another documented issue that led to an 
asymmetry in response (i.e., lack of a common communications plan), was the fact that 
the Milwaukee County Communications Center was not utilized to the fullest extent to 
assist the local communications center handling the incident. Lack of training and 
exercising together beforehand, as NIMS requires, led to this issue (USDHS, FEMA, 
2009b, objective #16). The local center was attempting to make emergency notifications 
to the county on the county center’s administrative phone lines. These lines are the last to 
be answered during large volume times, as was the case during this fire. Consequently, 
notifications were not made in a timely fashion because no one would answer the phones 
in the county center. A virtual EOC platform called “Wisconsin E-sponder” was not 
utilized during this event and could have resolved many of the communications 
problems. Even though a TERT was called in, it also did not use the system. That secure 
system could have linked the EOC with the on-scene incident command post and staging, 
as well as shelter operations.  
Communications with the public was an issue as well, due to the lack of a non-
emergency phone line or lines. Because of this lack of alternate phone numbers to call, 
citizens called the 911 lines and tied them up with administrative questions that could 
have been handled by clerical staff with a well-composed message. The mass 
communications tool, “A Child is Missing,” was used to send out a public evacuation 
notification. This tool is not designed for such an incident but was used after convincing 
the operators of the system. Other public notification systems can be purchased and 
utilized many times during a prolonged incident like this one, but they must be set up 
before the  event.  
Radio interoperability between mutual aid law enforcement units, the Emergency 
Operations Center and Incident Command, and various emergency shelters was 
nonexistent. This was due to a lack of interoperable radios since many agencies used 
different radio bands, and there was a lack of additional radios to hand out to key 
personnel. Police officers were sent out in small groups to evacuate hot zones without 
direct radio communications with their on-scene supervisor, while only one cell phone 
number was given to contact the 45 mutual aid officers who worked under him. The 
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responders on-scene were unaware that the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Department had 
60 cache portable radios that could have been deployed to bridge the various radio 
communication deficiencies that were experienced. The use of an on-scene 
communications unit leader (COML) in the service branch of the logistics section would 
have solved most of these interoperability and communications problems. Had the NIMS-
compliant ICS processes for communications and resources ordering been employed, a 
request for additional radios could have been made to the resource unit leader (RUL) that 
would have been filled within a short period of time. The RUL could also have deployed 
citizen emergency response teams (CERT) to augment the four days of perimeter, 
staging, and shelter operations, 24 hours a day. They were neither requested nor utilized, 
although trained teams and trained COMLs exist in the area.  
The circumstance of 45 officers reporting to one supervisor also creates an 
obvious span-of-control issue. According to NIMS-compliant ICS, a small span of 
control is the key to effective and efficient incident management. Within ICS, the span of 
control of any individual with incident management supervisory responsibility should 
range from three to seven subordinates only (USDHS, FEMA, 2005c, pp. 2–6). This lack 
of effective span of control led to problems as the threat picture changed to include 
ammonia gas. Some of the officers had level-C personal protective equipment (PPE) in 
their squads that could have been utilized had the need arisen. But without constant, 
effective communications via radio with a team leader who could assist them, the officers 
were left in danger and out of touch. Some officers from NIMS-compliant agencies 
arrived on-scene in response to the SMART call-up, expecting to be formed into strike 
teams with common communications and specific orders and safety plans.  When that did 
not happen, several officers were sent to evacuate neighborhoods that had already been 
contacted by other officers.  
To summarize the results found in the research of this incident: 
1) For some responders NIMS had a significant positive impact due to prior 
training and exercise in using the system, but others had limited 
knowledge;  
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2) There was excellent use of regional mutual aid through MABUS and 
SMART; 
3) Basic ICS knowledge and use was good, but knowledge of the deeper 
portions was not; 
4) Detailed incident action planning knowledge was not systemic; 
5) Situational awareness suffered due to a lack of coordination between the 
IC, the communications center, and the EOC;  
6) Resource management suffered due to the lack of a coordinating structure; 
7) Additional command personnel were not used because of a lack of 
understanding of what they could have brought to the scene. 
8) Communications suffered due to the lack of a communications unit leader. 
5. Analysis - Patrick Cudahy Plant Fire 
Although portions of the incident command system were successfully used, this 
case study exemplified how asymmetries in NIMS adoption impacted inter-local 
cooperation in this time of crisis. The lack of consistent NIMS adoption—and 
specifically the full application and utilization of ICS by all of the various agencies—
negatively affected this event. Dozens of agencies and multiple disciplines were involved 
in this response over a number of days, with each applying varying levels of utilization 
and implementation of ICS and the other tenets of NIMS, resulting in inefficiency in 
several areas. Some agencies and disciplines had made a conscious effort to adopt NIMS 
before this incident and were well versed in its tenets, yet some were not. This resulted in 
confusion at times among responders from the differing agencies because of the lack of 
consistency in methods, terminology, and standard operating procedures that full NIMS 










Applicable NIMS Objectives 
Case Study #1 
Did they meet the objective 
during the event? 
Case Study #2 
Did they meet the objective 
during the event? 
7) Revise EOPs, SOPs, to include NIMS No Yes 
8) Develop mutual aid agreements No Yes 
20) Systems and tools: common 
operating picture No No 
21) Inventory assets by kind and type Unknown Yes 
22) Interoperable communications, 
equipment, and systems No Yes 
23) Mutual aid agreements (EMAC) No Yes 
24) Credentialing personnel No No 
25) All incidents must use ICS, IAP, UC No Partial 
26) Multiagency coordination: use 
MACS No No 
27) Public information: use PIO, JIC, 
JIS No No 
28) Ensure public information is 
accurate and can be disseminated during 
events No No 





These interviews were designed to assist in answering the second research 
question: For those small and rural jurisdictions that are not meeting the standards and 
objectives as defined by NIMS, what are the reasons? Confidential interviews of selected 
professionals in the target demographic were conducted, and the results were cataloged 
and compared to see whether common themes developed in the process. 
County-level emergency managers (EM) were interviewed from selected 
Wisconsin counties that have mainly small or rural jurisdictions. These EMs were 
selected because of their experience with small jurisdictions that might not be utilizing or 
following the tenets of NIMS. They were also selected based upon the rural demographic 
and remote geographic locations of their counties in Wisconsin. An attempt was made to 
interview disparately located counties so as not gather too much information from one 
area of the state. These anonymous and confidential interviews were focused on 
examining why these jurisdictions have had difficulties conforming to these standards.  
One of the counties selected to be part of this research is typical of the others 
chosen: it has a population of less than 15,000 people, with fewer than 13 people per 
square mile, as compared to a major urban area like Milwaukee with more than 6,200 
people per square mile. The example county is poor by comparative economic standards 
and has been loosing population at a rate of about 10 percent over the last ten years 
(United States Census Bureau, 2009). 
The specific questions are detailed in Appendix A with short bullet points 
outlining the compilation of some answers. The answers from various counties naturally 
contradict one another since each has its own unique perspective on the issue, comes 
from different parts of the state, and faces unique preparedness challenges. The narrative 
addressing the major themes discovered during the research is outlined in the analysis 
section. 
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B. THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
The voluntary participants in the interviews were asked specific questions tied to 
the second research question. They were interviewed for approximately an hour each and 
were asked open-ended questions in order to flesh out their thoughts and identify 
pertinent factors involved in NIMS compliance. The data collected was analyzed 
qualitatively to identify themes. The following themes were coded in the analysis of the 
transcripts: 
1. Knowledge of the Requirements of NIMS 
Although the interviewees displayed differing levels of knowledge of the 
requirements of NIMS, most were not confident that the small towns, villages, and rural 
counties themselves had a thorough knowledge. The interviewees did not equate NIMS 
“adoption” (USDHS, FEMA, 2009b, objective #1) with “implementation” (USDHS, 
FEMA, 2009b, objective #2). They instead offered differing ideas as to how the smaller 
governmental units within their counties viewed the actual NIMS requirements. Some 
viewed adherence to NIMS requirements as simply signing the annual state-supplied 
form stating that the local jurisdiction was NIMS-compliant. Others went a bit further and 
added that it was also necessary to have key personnel pass the online courses 
administered by the Department of Homeland Security (USDHS, FEMA, 2009b, 
objectives #10, 11, 12). Most interviewees advised that the jurisdictions within their 
counties have formally adopted NIMS; the State of Wisconsin Emergency Management 
has supplied a resolution template for locals to have their local governments adopt and 
sign. This resolution is what most considered when asked whether they have met the 
requirement to have formally “adopted” NIMS. Once the governments of most of the 
jurisdictions within a county had passed the resolution and turned in the annual form, that 
county considered itself NIMS-compliant.  
Most counties equated the use of the incident command system (ICS) by law 
enforcement, fire, or emergency medical services (EMS) as evidence of being NIMS-
compliant without regard to the other 27 NIMS requirements. The use of an incident 
action plan (IAP) or ICS forms was almost nonexistent except as required by hazmat 
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teams. Hazmat and public health’s bio-terrorism consortiums have implemented a form 
of ICS, but that implementation is regional, not locally based. The IAP process includes 
management by objectives and a deliberative process for running major or long-term 
incidents. The small-town and rural fire services were credited as being the discipline that 
actually uses ICS, at least in the most rudimentary form, that is, simply calling command 
when arriving on scene. This is credited to being part of their discipline’s basic and 
advanced training. Law enforcement and other disciplines such as public works or public 
health in rural areas have not institutionalized the use of the ICS, the IAP process, or 
unified command (UC) as required by NIMS (USDHS, FEMA, 2009b, objective #25). As 
one emergency manager put it, “Although NIMS/ICS has been adopted, implementation 
lags far behind.” Adoption is simply the act of passing a municipal resolution stating that 
the community will follow NIMS and use ICS. Implementation requires actually 
institutionalizing its use.  
In some cases, plans are NIMS-compliant due to the efforts of a small number of 
individuals, but small counties are not capable of full compliance. One county emergency 
manager stated that in his county, it is his job to write all of the emergency operations 
plans for the local jurisdictions. He writes them all so that they are NIMS-compliant, but 
he recognized that even with those plans, the smaller the community the harder it is to 
complete the remaining NIMS requirements. Full compliance will always be a stretch for 
small communities. They may have the plan sitting on a shelf, but without the remaining 
parts of NIMS—preparedness through exercising and updates—the plan is not worth 
much.  
Another county’s experience was much bleaker.  The municipal police 
departments in that county do not want anything to do with NIMS implementation and 
refuse to use any of the tenets of NIMS. They told the interviewee, “We know what we 
know, why should we change?” This attitude is prevalent across that county and is 
evidenced by the fact that none of the emergency response entities in the county call 
command at incidents.  
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2. Perception of the Need to Follow NIMS 
Many jurisdictions perceive that their need to follow NIMS only extends as far as 
potential preparedness grant funding or the municipality’s resolution to adopt and 
implement NIMS. Their perception is that ICS is all of NIMS, and if they take the 
required online ICS courses, they are NIMS-compliant, regardless of whether they 
actually use ICS, the IAP, or UC. Other jurisdictions feel that they will not apply for or 
ever need preparedness funding from the federal government and therefore need not 
follow NIMS. One EM felt that the higher level of NIMS training disenfranchises the 
smaller communities and their responders. Once they see the scenarios in the ICS 300–
400 training, they realize they will never see such events in their lifetime nor will they 
ever have the personnel to fill out a full ICS structure.  
Many of the interviewees advised that they question the need for small 
communities and rural areas to follow NIMS since most of their volunteer and paid-on-
call responders and accompanying assets would not deploy away from their home area in 
times of disaster. If there is no need to deploy, then there is no need to interoperate with 
diverse elements from other regions or states. They often do assist other local 
communities in need of mutual, short-term aid, but they would not be able to deploy 
intrastate or interstate under an Emergency Mutual Assistant Compact (EMAC). They 
work with their local partners on a regular basis and know them by name as they all live 
in the same area. They do not need to learn new terminology, methods, processes, and 
systems since what they have has worked for them. Also, most rural areas have very few 
assets that they could afford to send away to assist another region or state because those 
assets are critical to the public safety of their home area. Therefore, they feel they do not 
need to understand, know, or follow the tenets of NIMS.s 
All of the interviewees advised that law enforcement in the rural areas and small 
towns in their areas do not take the basic, first step in utilizing the incident command 
system, which is “calling command.” The phrase “calling command” refers to the 
requirement that the first units, be they police or fire, arriving on the scene of an incident 
that will engender a response of four or more units must come over the radio and 
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announce that they have command. This notifies all responding units that ICS is being 
utilized, and they know who is in charge. Since these rural agencies do not take command 
at a scene, following even the basic ICS steps is not possible. Accounting for all 
personnel on scene, maintaining a unity of command, and evolving into a unified 
command—all of which are NIMS requirements—cannot take place. Most law 
enforcement agencies have a built-in command structure by rank so that calling command 
is not always needed when an agency is working with its own personnel. However, when 
mutual aid and multiple agencies get involved, the ICS is really needed; at that point, 
since it is never used or practiced, it can not be implemented. One EM from a very rural 
county with a low population gave an interesting take on local law enforcement and its 
relationship with emergency management: “Law enforcement does not have to comply 
with anything from the emergency management office; they are the authority around 
here.” This attitude and lack of understanding or buy-in from local law enforcement will 
lead to the ultimate failure of the NIMS system in that county and in other parts of the 
country.  
Many see preparing each agency, jurisdiction, and responder for a disaster that 
may never occur as failing the cost-benefit analysis; better to prepare for the real life 
threats they face every day is the thought. One county EM advised that it is up to the 
locals to complete the 28 NIMS requirements, not the county. This attitude has resulted in 
the failure of most local agencies to attempt to follow NIMS at all. Situational awareness 
and resiliency has suffered in these areas, and many expect the county emergency 
manager to assist them in time of need.  
3. Degree of NIMS Compliance 
The extent that rural areas and small communities are following the tenets of 
NIMS appears to depend largely on whether they have full-time staff or volunteers and 
whether they have local leadership in the transition to NIMS. Rural counties that have 
paid first responders on staff are more likely to have had NIMS training, although that 
training alone does not equate to NIMS indoctrination and institutionalization. If a county 
community has a paid staff of responders, they are more likely to have had the training.  
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Some interviewees from more populous but still rural counties responded that 
they have experienced great difficulties in their county in leading local rural communities 
down the path to NIMS compliance. Some of their communities have no understanding 
and will not follow NIMS. Their responders do not use ICS and do not work well 
together at scenes or incidents under unified command. One county does not have any 
municipalities that use the statewide virtual EOC system called E-sponder because they 
do not take preparedness seriously (see Appendix B). Those municipalities feel that they 
do not have the time to take NIMS training, and since most are volunteers, they will not 
take time off from their regular job to do it because it costs them money. Law 
enforcement agencies in particular do not feel that they need to learn NIMS, since they 
just direct traffic at scenes.  
Many rural communities do not have the resources necessary to respond to 
regional interagency emergencies where the ICS would come into play. None of the 
interviewees talked about the other focuses of NIMS, such as credentialing responders, 
upgrading plans, and exercising those plans. Because of the limited number of resources 
available, local mutual aid is the norm, but it is organizational, not operational. As one 
emergency manager put it, “ICS, although adopted, is seldom used below the incident 
command. This lack of implementation below the IC level severely impacts a rural 
department’s ability to manage assets from a wide area in a scenario of an expanding 
incident.” 
Another reason why the greater NIMS philosophy is not being pursued in small 
towns and rural communities is that there is a lack of real situations where NIMS would 
apply. This view equates NIMS with ICS only, not the greater picture of preparedness 
and planning. One fire chief advised a rural emergency manager during ICS 300 training 
(Intermediate ICS) that he did not have the staff to implement a full ICS organization, 
either in trained or available staff, and he could not envision an event where he would 
have the need to use the skills introduced in the course.  
There is a disconnect between the knowledge and training of rural responders and 
their ability to interoperate in a real-world situation and to deploy to other areas of the 
state and work side by side with agencies who are well schooled and follow NIMS. The 
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completion of online courses or even classroom instruction does not imply competence. 
Further exercises, after-action reports, and corrective action plans would allow rural 
responders to gain much-needed experience, but that again raises the issue that they do 
not have the time or funding to pay responders to gain that experience. The smaller the 
agency or jurisdiction, the less likely it is to have the ability to interoperate in a large-
scale multiagency event outside of the home area.  
One EM from a relatively poor county with a very small population remarked that 
the current status of NIMS implementation is poor. Personnel have been through the 
training, but almost none of those who have had the training would feel comfortable or be 
proficient in the detailed workings of NIMS. It was felt that the training is generally 
completed just to “check the box” in order to be NIMS compliant. This one-time training 
does not help anyone at the county level. Compliance to the basic ICS training 
requirement alone does not give county and municipal employees or volunteers the skills 
needed to be proficient in times of disaster, or even to assist them on a relatively simple 
emergency call. The problem with NIMS “adoption” is in trying to get rural volunteers 
and public officials to buy in to the system. There is a lack of support due to the lack of 
belief that the NIMS system has any applicability to a rural area. 
4. Incentives or Disincentives to Meet the National Preparedness Goal 
The “carrot” of preparedness grants funding, if one qualifies, represents the 
current incentive to meet the national preparedness goal, through implementation of the 
28 NIMS objectives. The “stick” is the denial of preparedness funding if a jurisdiction is 
not NIMS-compliant. The majority of jurisdictions have taken the simple steps necessary 
to say they have formally adopted NIMS, as most have passed a local resolution to that 
effect. But the institutionalization of NIMS or ICS across their world is lacking. Most 
have never seen or heard from any federal governmental entity that has actually checked 
or verified that a rural agency has developed plans, SOPs, processes, and exercises or 
completed ongoing training or institutionalized the use of the incident command system, 
including IAP or unified command. This lack of verification at the federal level has 
discredited the NIMS program as a whole, and specifically the local proponents who 
deliver the training.  
56  
The disincentives to following NIMS and becoming an active participant in 
meeting the national preparedness goal are many for small-town and rural responders. 
The larger full-time or professionally staffed departments can afford to send their 
personnel to training on duty-time, while volunteer responders from rural areas must 
attend on their own time, many having to take off from their paid jobs to do so. This 
represents a great sacrifice that larger urban responders do not have to make in order to 
commit to NIMS. That fact alone is the largest disincentive to following NIMS. 
According to one emergency manager, if this funding were to have been implemented, 
“rural volunteer agencies would have been trained at the level enjoyed by their paid 
contemporaries.”  
5. Roadblocks to Meeting the National Preparedness Goal 
Time, dollars, and training are all impediments to full implementation of the 
NIMS objectives. The online training courses through FEMA’s Emergency Management 
Institute (EMI) are not as effective as the classroom courses and are subject to fraudulent 
results when the test results are passed on from one student to another as was identified 
by interviewees and the personal experiences of the author. The interactive learning 
environment of a classroom course facilitates true understanding of the complexities of 
NIMS. One emergency manager stated when speaking of the online classes, “This 
delivery has severe problems; learning is secondary to meeting a requirement.”  
Classroom delivery of the ICS-100 or 200 classes contains 16 student contact hours, with 
online classes being completed in fewer than 4 hours for most students. The gap between 
the two methods of delivery is representative of the difficulty in conveying a true 
understanding of the fundamentals of ICS.  
For small-town and rural agencies, the time and funding needed to attend the 
required training in the classroom (ICS-300 and 400) is prohibitive given that most 
responders who need the training are volunteers. Most rural communities cannot pay their 
responders to attend training courses out of their area or pay to back-fill their workplace 
vacancy. Volunteer responders cannot attend NIMS training for their volunteer position 
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at a fire department or EMS since they hold down full-time, paying jobs. Many are not 
willing to take vacation time for NIMS training, even if the training costs them nothing.  
One interviewee stated that “communities prepare for the exposures they face.” 
Most rural counties have a large geographic area to cover but have a small population 
base. Small towns and villages face the same problem but some have a small geographic 
area with few residents and even fewer responders. They utilize regional preparedness to 
overcome these inherent faults. Mutual aid is a fact of life in these areas. The roadblock 
that one EM faced was that “the size of the disaster was not as important as the duration,” 
because local responders are volunteers and cannot stay away from home and work for 
long. These volunteers are more than willing to help out a neighbor in need but would not 
deploy around the state helping other communities far away. If they did deploy, there 
would be no equipment or assets and no responders left to protect the home front while 
they were away. Public works preparedness is a problem because these individuals are 
the furthest from the public safety sector.  
Another roadblock is the will to change. The responders in many rural areas see 
the events of 9/11 and the terrorist threat as something that big cities, not they, need to 
worry about. Preparedness suffers as a result. Disasters come about once in a career for 
many of them, so the time needed to prepare is not time well spent. They do not see 
themselves as being subject to deployment under EMAC or even within the state; 
therefore they do not need to learn “this NIMS stuff.” Additionally, most small towns and 
rural communities are staffed by a single full-time clerk who is the point of contact for 
the county emergency manager.  Some clerks do not have access to the Internet in their 
offices. Most of the state and federal NIMS information and documentation is accessed 
online, including training. This roadblock is common in rural areas.  
6. Solutions to Upgrade Rural Preparedness 
Each of the interviewees had his own suggested solutions to the many problems 
described in the research. One method to correct one of the inherent deficiencies that 
rural responders face when attempting to fully implement NIMS is to reimburse volunteer 
responders when they attend training, when that training takes them away from their paid 
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employment. This concept of paid backfill would address one of the major roadblocks to 
rural preparedness as expressed in the implementation of NIMS objectives. The program 
must have merit to rural responders; it must be useful. The number of different courses 
required and the redundancy among them causes anxiety and questioning of the quality of 
the materials. One solution would be to combine courses and shorten the objectives to 
make them applicable to rural responders by using rural scenarios.  
Some felt that the NIMS one-size-fits-all approach should be reexamined and a 
regional approach taken instead where regions establish their own priorities. Grant funds 
should be given to the states, allowing each region of the state to define its own priorities 
to meet local conditions. Abbreviated ICS classes would also help as volunteer 
responders can not travel and stay away from their homes for many days, especially when 
they do not get paid. Regionalized teams should be built, but they must come from the 
full-time paid departments and agencies since the volunteer agencies do not have the time 
or the capacity to fill this role. The Department of Natural Resources of the state of 
Wisconsin has incident management teams (IMTs) that are able to come in and assist 
local rural jurisdictions. But those teams are state assets, and Wisconsin is a home rule 
state. 
Regionalization of NIMS compliance efforts will save time and money. Instead of 
each local jurisdiction’s trying to meet 28 requirements by themselves, a group effort is 
much more plausible. Much as the incident management team concept works well to fill a 
gap in response capability, a regional NIMS effort would have more success. Volunteers 
as a whole do not have the time to go to training but are willing to be directed by NIMS 
trained personnel during an incident in the correct manner. For NIMS to expect every 
community to have the same level of knowledge and preparedness is not realistic; rural 
areas are much more handicapped than their urban counterparts. It has been suggested 
that areas defined as rural should have a different set of standards, instead of the current 
all-or-nothing approach of NIMS. Individualized ICS training would also assist local 
emergency responders in applying the tenets of NIMS to their situation. For a local fire 
department in a county whose population is just under 15,000 to practice an urban  
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scenario where thousands of responders come to assist is unrealistic and insulting. Many 
responders just laugh at the federally prescribed training, feeling that it does not apply to 
them. 
Local tribal incident management teams (LTIMT) developed at the regional level 
would help locals to meet NIMS requirements if those teams were developed within the 
area and built trust with the locals. Generally, LTIMTs are designed to assist local 
agencies who are overwhelmed while managing an incident, but it has been suggested 
that they could be used to help facilitate NIMS implementation. They have the training 
and with some additional guidance could fit the role of regional NIMS implementation 
facilitators.  
C. ANALYSIS 
When NIMS was established in 2004, there was a national structure built to 
support federal NIMS implementation efforts but no state-to-local mechanism. This lack 
of follow-through has resulted in county emergency managers taking the brunt of the 
dissatisfaction of local rural communities with NIMS. The county emergency managers  
are asked to facilitate NIMS compliance in addition to their many other duties, but they 
have no legal authority or mandate to do so. As was stated in one interview, “We are not 
the NIMS police.”  This lack of accountability to the tenets and standards of NIMS by the 
federal government, state government, and county government has resulted in an unequal 
distribution of compliant jurisdictions. Preparedness and response interoperability and 
capacity suffer as a result. Small towns and rural areas rely on volunteers, and they 
cannot stand any additional federal mandates. Local funding in rural areas for emergency 
management or homeland security is minimal at best and nonexistent at worst. Rural 
county emergency managers do not have the time or personnel to assist agencies or 
jurisdictions in meeting NIMS requirements.  
NIMS adoption by municipal resolution is widespread, but actual implementation 
in rural areas is minimal. Many small towns and rural areas feel that NIMS mandates are 
unreachable, and they therefore do only the minimum required. Some municipal police 
departments in generally rural counties do not want NIMS, will not use it, and do not 
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want to learn it. Full NIMS compliance is a stretch for rural, small-town entities; 
however, implementation has been observed on regional teams. Public works 
implementation is lacking or nonexistent. Even though some county emergency managers 
write all of the emergency operations plans for their rural county, most do not. It is up to 
each local jurisdiction to accept the county EM as their EM because of home rule. Most 
jurisdictions just self-certify NIMS compliance, even when they have not met the 
requirements. 
The federal government did not include the rural paradigm when initially 
assessing the unmet preparedness needs of the nation after 9/11. They looked at high-
value targets and urban infrastructure when building their models and setting national 
preparedness goals. As the years progressed and the DHS grew, attempts were made to 
include small-town and rural entities in the picture through the development of the Rural 
Domestic Preparedness Consortium (RDPC) and the Small State and Rural Advocate 
Office within FEMA. However, neither has taken on the leadership role needed to ensure 
small-town and rural inclusion in the national preparedness discussion. The RDPC did 
not return research requests for information for this thesis, and the Small State and Rural 
Advocate position has been unfilled since 2008. A search to find personnel at FEMA who 
could respond to research questions on rural preparedness was fruitless. It was found that 
the Small State and Rural Advocate office had no dedicated staff, and when asked for all 
documentation on rural preparedness, only one document was produced as having been 
prepared since the inception of the office in 2007. That nine-page document was required 
to be submitted to Congress. It is the FY2010 report to Congress on disaster regulations 
and has little to do with the mission of a small state and rural advocate outside of 
reporting the percentage of approved requests for disaster assistance (Rural Domestic 
Preparedness Consortium, 2010). 
It is apparent that the lowest jurisdictional levels in this country are in a far better 
state of local preparedness for emergencies than their urban counterparts despite the fact 
that no rural advocate exists at the highest levels in the Department of Homeland 
Security. The Department of Homeland Security appears to have had little strategic effect 
on rural preparedness since 2004, given the fact that rural responders have built some 
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level of resiliency without federal help. This “bottom up” approach to locally established 
preparedness does not fit the NIMS model or meet the national preparedness goal, but it 
appears to be adequate for most of the emergencies that small towns and rural 
communities see on a day-to-day basis. It is the catastrophic disasters that tax rural 
capabilities, where the NIMS model would come to the forefront.  
D. FINDINGS 
These interviews have shown that one of the main factors impeding NIMS 
implementation is a full understanding of the depth and scope of NIMS and an awareness 
of the extent to which NIMS can positively assist in small-town and rural preparedness. 
Most interviewees tied ICS directly to the definition of NIMS, and for them the two were 
not separate and distinct. It has been difficult to get jurisdictions to understand that NIMS 
is a philosophy of management including five components: 1) preparedness, 2) 
communications and information management, 3) resource management, 4) command 
and management, and 5) ongoing management and maintenance (USDHS, FEMA, 
2008b, p. 7). 
The Department of Homeland Security, through Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) does not hold jurisdictions accountable to actually implement NIMS, 
even after 5 years of requirements; this is clearly another factor that impedes NIMS 
implementation. The National Integration Center’s Incident Management Systems 
Integration (IMSI) division of NIMS does not require jurisdictions to have actually 
complied with all 28 of the NIMS objectives; instead, they only have to have “been 
initiated and/or are in progress toward completion” (Finkl, 2009). The Department of 
Homeland Security, through FEMA, also sent out a letter to all state and territorial 
governors, advising them that they must implement NIMS objectives, but the agency only 
requires that their state is “working toward comprehensive NIMS implementation” and 
should address “progress” (Ward, 2009).  
It is apparent from the interviews that were conducted that NIMS implementation 
and successful navigation towards the national preparedness goal is dependant upon 
leadership at the local level. If the local leader, be he a chief elected official, a police or 
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fire chief, or a county EM, does not make NIMS a priority, it will not happen. This 
leadership must extend and be supported by the state and the national governments. 
Unfunded mandates without local input or buy-in create hard feelings and resentment and 
will not further national preparedness.  
A single set of standards and training for all jurisdictions at the local level is not 
realistic. Presently, NIMS breaks down requirements only into federal, tribal, state, and 
local levels. Each state is different, but more importantly, each local community is 
different. Rural counties are administered differently from more populous counties in 
urban areas with a larger tax base. A separate rural standard must be created within the 
NIMS paradigm to reach those areas left out of the current national preparedness picture.  
Small towns and rural communities rely heavily on volunteers, cooperation, and 
mutual aid within their local region, to meet their public safety mission. NIMS needs to 
have metrics that fit within this paradigm in order to assist these communities in meeting 
the national preparedness goal. Working against normal conventions of everyday 
response for personnel who do not have the time, funding, or manpower to learn entirely 
new systems that may never be necessary is problematic and unrealistic.  
Local funding in rural areas for Emergency Management or Homeland Security is 
minimal at best and nonexistent at worst. Rural county emergency managers do not have 
the time or trained personnel to assist agencies or jurisdictions in meeting NIMS 
requirements. County EMs are required to meet many other federal mandates that take a 
significant amount of time and energy.  
Given these findings, it is apparent that waiting for the Department of Homeland 
Security to supply funding or some kind of leadership will not be fruitful for small 
communities and rural areas, given DHS’s track record over the last five years. As they 
have done throughout time, small-town and rural residents must rely upon themselves 
and their neighbors to build preparedness. The tenets of NIMS are viable for rural 
communities, but the doctrine must be relevant to the rural demographic based on local 
priorities. The top-down, one-size-fits-all approach has not worked and will not work. An 
entirely new strategy must be developed with an allowance for local variation and 
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application based upon the threats and hazards faced by small towns and rural 
communities. These local variations, however, must be consistent with the tenets of 
NIMS, yet allow for some flexibility in application.  
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V. INTER-LOCAL COOPERATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The impact on inter-local cooperation from asymmetric NIMS adoption has been 
scrutinized in prior sections. Systemic and long-term solutions were examined in light of 
the current status of small-town and rural preparedness using the state of Wisconsin as 
the data set and the annual compliance metrics of the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) as a measuring stick. The goal of the thesis was to develop a new 
strategy for upgrading preparedness in small and rural communities to meet national 
preparedness standards. Case studies were examined to explore the effects of asymmetric 
preparedness between urban and rural communities. Selected emergency managers from 
rural counties around the state were confidentially interviewed to gain firsthand insight 
into the problems that small towns and rural communities are having in meeting NIMS 
standards and to flesh out possible solutions. Major themes impacting the issue were 
developed from the case studies, interviews, and the review of relevant literature and 
similar systems. These themes were used as a basis for the development of conclusions 
and proposed solutions.  
1. Themes Impacting the Issue 
1. Knowledge of the requirements of NIMS;  
2. Perception of the need to follow NIMS; 
3. Degree of NIMS compliance; 
4. Incentives or disincentives to meet the national preparedness goal; 
5. Roadblocks to meeting the national preparedness goal; 
6. Solutions to upgrade rural preparedness. 
2. Conclusions from the Research 
1. The Department of Homeland Security has not made small-town and rural 
preparedness a priority. Local communities must lead from the bottom-up.  
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2. One of the main factors impeding NIMS implementation is a full 
understanding of the depth and scope of NIMS and the extent to which 
NIMS can positively assist in small-town and rural preparedness. 
3. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will not hold 
jurisdictions accountable to actually implement NIMS. 
4. NIMS implementation and successful navigation towards the national 
preparedness goal is dependant upon leadership at the local level. 
5. A single set of standards and training for all jurisdictions at the local level 
is not realistic. Rural preparedness needs must be defined locally. 
6. Small towns and rural communities rely heavily on volunteers, 
cooperation, and mutual aid within their local region in order to meet their 
public safety mission. 
7. Local funding in rural areas for emergency management or homeland 
security is minimal at best and nonexistent at worst. Rural county 
emergency managers do not have the time or trained personnel to assist 
agencies or jurisdictions in meeting NIMS requirements. 
3. Summary of Recommendations 
1. A new, flexible rural preparedness doctrine and strategy at DHS is needed. 
2. Build regional preparedness groups (both rural and urban) with national 
funding and local control, using the Milwaukee UASI model. 
3. Provide regional preparedness leadership staff funded by FEMA within 
each local region in each state.  
4. Utilize rural preparedness block grants funded by FEMA, using the 
community development block grant process. 
4. Method of Implementation 
1. Create a collective vision for the future of small-town and rural 
preparedness at the DHS. 
2. Provide local preparedness programs with financial support through the 
community development block grant funding system.  
3. Build upon the natural cooperative model found in small towns and rural 
communities to achieve preparedness. 
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4. Utilize the local tribal incident management team program as a basis for 
the development of regional preparedness groups. 
B. UNDERSTANDING THE URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES  
The national preparedness goal and the tenets of NIMS seek to have all levels of 
government, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and citizens inculcate a mindset 
of preparedness into all segments of their life structures so as ensure their capability to 
respond to and recover from all possible hazards. The desired end state for each entity is 
to ensure a continuity of operations, a continuity of government, and the return to a state 
of normalcy in the community as soon as possible. In order to see this principle through 
to fruition, it is incumbent upon every community, large or small, urban or rural, paid or 
volunteer, private or public, to take steps to plan for anticipated and unforeseen disaster. 
All must mitigate known hazards, train with their partners for possible emergency 
situations, create plans, exercise those plans, and take corrective actions to engender a 
cohesive and coordinated response and recovery. With this objective in mind, some 
communities in small towns and rural areas need both financial and experiential 
assistance to reach these goals. Specific doctrine, scenarios, processes, and procedures for 
rural and small-town communities must be established to bring those most tenuous areas 
into the fold of national preparedness. In order to do this, the asymmetries between urban 
and rural society must be recognized and embraced.  
The sociology is markedly different between urban and rural regions in this 
country. Small-town and rural residents are more resilient out of necessity. The personal 
motivation of rural responders is based upon the knowledge that they must rely on their 
neighbors in time of need and trust that they will help, as there is little other assistance at 
hand. The person giving help to his neighbor today knows that tomorrow he may need 
assistance from that same neighbor. Rural and small-town residents know that it is not 
unusual for public safety entities to take up to a half an hour or more to respond to a call 
for help under normal circumstances, and they may not come at all during disasters. This 
is due to their physical remoteness and the lack of response staff waiting at a local 
station. On-call volunteer responders must come from home or their full-time jobs, which 
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may be many miles away. This situation is further exacerbated by the recent economic 
downturn, which has caused many to lose their jobs or to have to travel longer to get to 
new jobs. Rural responders are mostly volunteers who are not paid for their efforts and 
are subject to being victims of the same disaster they may be asked to respond to and help 
their community recover from. Many of these resilient citizens grow their own food, have 
their own back-up generators, cut firewood for their heat, hunt for meat, raise some 
livestock, keep months’ worth of food stores in their basements, and have their own 
wells. They are generally not as dependant on municipal water supplies, grocery stores, 
or the national power grid as their urban counterparts.  
The work force is also quite different between the two demographics. Urban 
public safety responders are mostly full-time, paid, municipal employees who are heavily 
unionized. The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) even prohibits them from 
volunteering for duties that they would normally be paid to perform. Jurisdictions in 
urban areas are very territorial by nature and interoperation under mutual aid is often 
difficult. DHS preparedness grant funding has been based in part upon a community’s 
proximity to large urban areas that have been determined to be more strategically critical 
and valuable by national standards. Urban citizens expect an immediate response when a 
call for help is made, regardless of the scope of the disaster, whereas rural residents do 
not.  
The definition of preparedness for rural areas as compared to their urban 
counterparts is another marked difference. Urban preparedness has been defined 
generally as the capacity to respond to and recover from large-scale disaster and return to 
a state of normalcy in a short period of time. For a utility in large urban area to be offline 
for more than a few hours is considered a disaster, but rural areas are not so 
disadvantaged. Rural areas know that when an ice storm takes down power lines across a 
region, for example, it could take days or even weeks to restore power. Rural residents 
plan their lives around this eventuality, prepare for it, and accept it as part of their chosen 
rural lifestyle. In a cost-benefit analysis for the public utilities, it makes much greater 
sense to restore power to urban areas and their condensed pool of customers before 
dealing with the sparsely populated rural areas. Rural customers know that they must be 
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individually resilient and prepared for a snowstorm, power outage, or flood, and they rely 
on their neighbors for help if needed. City dwellers pay high taxes for full-time public 
safety professionals and a government infrastructure to support them in good times and 
bad. Consequently, they expect a greater return for their investment during times of 
disaster.  
C. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OUTLOOK 
Rural preparedness is suffering in this country because the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has focused policy, grants, training, and significant efforts 
towards preparing and protecting urban areas and high-value infrastructure. Many DHS 
sponsored documents and reports from 2005 and 2006 recognize the problem—even 
suggesting solutions—but to no avail. As a result, rural areas and small towns have been 
left out of the process and do not have the time, money, or resources to meet the national 
preparedness goal in the NIMS objectives on their own. The Department of Homeland 
Security recognized this gap as long ago as 2005, when it stated, “The challenge is to 
develop an interconnected and complementary “national” system that balances the need 
for flexibility with the need for accountability” (USDHS, 2005, p.1) Even five years after 
that statement, these rural and small-town areas are still disconnected from the greater 
Homeland Security project. A check of the DHS website on July 19, 2010, for the key 
words “rural preparedness” did not receive any hits for those two words together—a clear 
indication of a lack of emphasis.  
DHS currently uses a standardized approach (one size fits all) to national 
preparedness based upon threats and hazards to large urban areas. As far back as 2005, it 
was reported to the NIMS at FEMA that small and/or rural jurisdictions would benefit 
from a regional approach. The agency recognized over five years ago that in many 
instances smaller communities may not have the resources to implement all the elements 
of NIMS on their own. However, by working together with other localities in their 
regions, these jurisdictions will be able to pool their resources to implement NIMS 
(USDHS, FEMA, NIMS, 2005). The DHS did not heed its own recommendations.  
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The current standardized approach to preparedness is reflected in DHS-sponsored 
training, grants, and exercises that are all based upon urban incidents with hundreds or 
even thousands of responders. In fact, the word “rural” is only mentioned once in 
FEMA’s document “State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy: Guidance on 
Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal”—and then only by way of 
example (USDHS, FEMA, 2005a). 
Rural threats and vulnerabilities are unique, as are rural response capabilities, and 
they are not symmetrical to their urban counterparts. NIMS recognizes that prevention, 
protection against, response to, and recovery from major events (as represented by the 
national planning scenarios) will require that capabilities be drawn from a wide area. The 
area from which resources will be drawn may or may not expand beyond the current area 
served by existing regions (USDHS, FEMA, 2005a, p. 9).  According to the strategy, 
“States and Urban Areas are asked to examine current regional collaboration efforts and 
explore new approaches to developing regional capabilities.” The new rural collaborative 
approach suggested in this thesis is one such effort.  
The federal government through FEMA recognizes that the regional approach is 
the preferred methodology to success in the national preparedness domain. Deputy 
Administrator Richard Serino of FEMA acknowledged in an interview with Homeland 
Security Today, “When disaster strikes, we understand that the response is managed by 
the local, tribal and state officials. We get that … each region has its own different 
nuances and culture” (McCarter, 2010, p.16).  
Because rural and small-town threats and vulnerabilities are distinctive, 
preparedness grants for rural areas should be given based upon need. Under this new 
model, regional exercises would be cooperatively developed to reflect local hazards that 
rural responders may face in their regions. For example, for rural public-safety personnel 
to practice for a mass-casualty attack on a crowded sports stadium with 60,000 attendees 
is unrealistic and represents a situation they will never see. But they may experience 
long-term power outages or outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease. The federal 
government has differing preparedness priorities from those of small towns and rural 
communities. In his research McCarter points out that the federal government is 
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preoccupied with possible catastrophes of high consequence but low probability, while 
state governments are concerned with catastrophes of low national consequence but high 
local probability. DHS officials would like to prepare and train for biological agents, 
while officials in a state like Iowa would like to prepare and train for massive flooding 
(McCarter, 2010, p. 16). 
D. A PROBLEM RECOGNIZED BY OTHERS 
Emergency management professionals at the state and local levels have long 
understood the difference between urban and rural emergency issues. In a recent article in 
Homeland1 News, author Dianna Bryant states that the challenges of emergency 
management are different for rural communities than for urban ones and can be 
categorized under four major themes:  
1. Resource limitation;  
2. Separation and remoteness;  
3. Low population density;  
4. Communication.  
Bryant argues that the deficiencies faced by rural emergency managers can be 
attributed to the lack of political and financial capital that is needed to provide 
“equivalent resources to what’s considered essential in urban areas” (Bryant, 2009, p. 2). 
Her conclusions assert the same findings as found in this thesis research: “Exercise 
scenarios often assume equipment and manpower capabilities that are unrealistic in rural 
areas.… The reality is that rural emergency management faces challenges that are 
unfamiliar and often unknown in urban areas” (Bryant, 2009, p. 2). 
The U.S. Congress recognized over four years ago that a national, top-down 
model of planning and preparedness is not congruent with an effective intergovernmental 
response. Because of the problems with response during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was 
required through the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
(PKEMRA) to support operational planning in its regions. The National Academy of 
Public Administration (NAPA) report states that, 
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This engagement should be developed with the goal of building an 
effective partnership between the regions and headquarters that is based 
upon mutual cooperation, ongoing involvement and communications and 
supportive leadership at all level. (NAPA, 2009, p. 36) 
However, even as late as December of 2009, FEMA’s five-year plan still does not 
meet the PKEMRA’s requirements in this area, and further outreach is required (NAPA, 
2009, p.2).  
Other emergency management professionals have recognized that, even five years 
after Katrina, building out regional capabilities “remains a problematic issue for FEMA 
and a distant ideal.… But difficulty in developing regional responses is also the result of 
fundamentally different approaches by federal, state and local governments” (McCarter, 
2010, p. 15). In the report from the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), FEMA 
is advised to take a robust approach to such planning but to use resources within each 
region to tailor plans for that area’s concerns (PNSR, 2009, p. 5). 
Chief Thomas Bauer’s 2009 CHDS thesis on NIMS and law enforcement found 
similar lessons learned in his research regarding Wisconsin. He conducted surveys of law 
enforcement leaders from around the state and found that most would not even respond to 
the NIMS survey. Among those who did, he found that, “Some leaders, as indicated in 
the survey, do not embrace the idea of NIMS, as a terrorist attack is improbable in rural 
Wisconsin communities, but there is little appreciation that NIMS is much more apt to be 
used in local response of natural disasters” (Bauer, 2009, p. 8). Of the 550 NIMS surveys 
sent out, only 67 were answered. Of those who did answer, almost 66 percent of the 
agencies acknowledged that they were not proficient with NIMS and have not 
incorporated ICS into daily operational response. “An overall response rate of 12 percent 
suggests that there is little interest in NIMS-related issues” (Bauer, 2009, p. 13). Many of 
the responses stated that NIMS is not currently designed for small agencies or rural areas.  
The National Emergency Managers Association, through their 2008 survey, has 
recognized challenges to NIMS compliance, as well as the seeds of the solution. They 
described false assumptions by the federal government concerning NIMS compliance 
(Bauer, 2009, p. 36): 
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One is the assumption that “one size fits all” which assumes that all 
jurisdictions have the same level of resources, risks, hazards and 
vulnerability … Like all states [they] range from large metropolitan areas 
to rural low density jurisdictions and attempting to apply the same rules 
for implementation or even the same set of logical reasons for complying 
is not possible. (NEMA, 2008, p. 1). 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. HYPOTHESIS: A NEW RURAL PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY 
Rural preparedness can be increased through a new, demographically inclusive 
approach to national preparedness. “The national preparedness system is, both literally 
and figuratively, only as strong as its weakest link” (NAPA, 2009, p. 64). This weak link 
is the integration of small-town and rural preparedness with national preparedness. By 
creating a regional, customized approach to preparedness through the addition of a rural 
doctrine, buy-in and participation would increase in small towns and rural areas across 
the country. Local emergency-management personnel in those communities would begin 
to participate in the greater homeland security project because they would understand its 
relevance to them. As already required by NIMS, rural, regional collaboration would 
focus on several areas, including the expansion of mutual aid and assistance compacts 
among contiguous state, local, and tribal entities and their private and nongovernmental 
partners and the extension of the scope of those compacts to include preincident 
preparedness activities such as planning, training, and exercising (USDHS, FEMA, 
2005a, p. 9).  
Congress and the Department of Homeland Security have recognized the rural 
gap in existing national-preparedness doctrine. They have established the rural domestic 
preparedness consortium (RDPC, or the Consortium) to develop and deliver relevant all-
hazards training in support of rural homeland-security requirements. It is these 
requirements that must be modified into guidance that will allow local regions within 
states to build their own requirements based upon their threats and hazards. The National 
Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) within the Department of Homeland Security, 
Office of Infrastructure Protection, Emergency Management and Response Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) has recognized this rural paradigm as well. 




 Build relationships with diverse sectors of the community; 
 Do not rely solely on official power relationships to get things done; 
 Encourage volunteerism as a rich source of personnel for emergency 
services; 
 Reach outside the community to achieve political access and leverage 
additional resources; 
 Develop cooperative agreements between and among the emergency 
services, community organizations, and local businesses to secure funding 
and staffing. (USDHS, National Infrastructure Coordinating Center, 2009) 
These solutions offered by the government address some of the soft issues having 
to do with rural preparedness but do not touch the core doctrinal issues that have plagued 
DHS since its inception. The federal government has further attempted to begin the 
process of correcting this rural deficiency through the amendment of the Stafford Act and 
the Post-Katrina Reform Act of 2006 (Bryant, 2009, p. 3). Title II of the Robert T. 
Stafford Act was amended by adding Section 326, which designates within FEMA a 
position for a Small State and Rural Advocate:  
The Small State and Rural Advocate shall be an advocate for the fair 
treatment of small States and rural communities in the provision of 
assistance under this Act. 
Duties- The Small State and Rural Advocate shall— 
(1)  participate in the disaster declaration process under section 401 
and the emergency declaration process under section 501, to ensure 
that the needs of rural communities are being addressed; 
(2)  assist small population States in the preparation of requests for 
major disaster or emergency declarations; and 
(3)  conduct such other activities as the Director of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency considers appropriate. 
However, this Small State and Rural Advocate position, a key national level 
position at FEMA, has not been staffed or filled for over 18 months. This indicates a lack 
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of focus by the top levels of the federal government on the problem and leaves a rural 
advocate and leadership void. In 2010, a private advocacy organization called the Project 
on National Security Reform (PNSR) created a report that urged FEMA to create 
“regional catastrophic preparedness staffs to facilitate planning that meets the goals of 
both federal and state agencies” (PNSR, 2009, p. 19). If this proposal were implemented, 
federal direct assistance for baseline resourcing of catastrophic national preparedness 
regional catastrophic preparedness staffs would be paid for by the federal government, 
but the personnel would come from the states.  
This cultural shift can be accomplished with little additional funding and could be 
easily added to existing structures without competing with them. This effort fits into the 
federal preparedness picture: the first of the seven national priorities identified in the 
national preparedness goal is to expand regional cooperation and capabilities (USDHS, 
FEMA, 2005a, p. 8). The current DHS strategy encourages local governments to be 
involved in the strategic planning process performed by states and urban areas but does 
not include their rural contemporaries. It is the hope that this new regional collaboration 
will allow for a multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary approach to building capabilities 
for all four mission areas, spreading costs, and sharing risk across geographic areas 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2005, p. 9).  
B. METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION 
This new strategy will redefine the focus of DHS preparedness and create true 
national preparedness—regardless of population density—through volunteer, 
individualized regional preparedness groups (RPG). These groups may piggyback on the 
local tribal incident management team (LTIMT) program in regions where it is used. The 
manual for the development of these teams has been written and is being used in 
Wisconsin and in several other states (Knudten et al., 2009). The highly trained local 
personnel who make up LTIMTs can form these regional groups to support rural 
preparedness through the development of personal relationships and trust with response 
partners and by passing on best practices and lessons learned.  
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In Bauer’s thesis research, he suggests as one solution the coordination of training 
with agencies that have established NIMS.  One of his survey respondents stated, “Have a 
core group of NIMS-proficient personnel to ensure NIMS compliance in the event of a 
major incident” (Bauer, 2009, p. 17). This suggestion fits into the proposed solution of 
this thesis on the NIMS rural implementation problem. Partnerships between those who 
know NIMS and those who do not will create new knowledge through shared experiences 
with little cost and will result in significant gains towards a secure and prepared 
homeland. “Much like tutors assist those weighed down by complex concepts in the 
academic environment, a tutor or mentor might be needed to walk the student 
(administrator) step by step through the minefield” (Bauer, 2009, p. 44). As these 
regional LTIMTs develop and build nationally, they can facilitate NIMS adoption in rural 
areas by utilizing their expertise in national-level preparedness and response strategy, 
coupled with their local connectedness. 
The innovation found in the development of a new rural preparedness doctrine is 
that it changes DHS preparedness efforts from the current standardized approach (one 
size fits all) based upon large urban areas and their assets to a customized approach that 
more closely fits both the urban and the rural paradigm. The current standardized 
approach to preparedness is reflected in DHS-sponsored training, grants, and exercises 
that are all based upon outlandish (from a rural perspective) urban incidents with 
hundreds or even thousands of responders. A customized approach for rural areas would 
see training scenarios based upon the realities of rural life with a dozen responders 
coming to a disaster, not great multitudes as in urban areas. Rural and small-town areas 
have more of a problem managing and accounting for volunteers during the response to a 
disaster than they do accounting for public-safety staff. Rural threats and vulnerabilities 
are unique, requiring grants based upon need and exercises that are developed locally to 
reflect hazards in their region. This customized approach to preparedness would create 
buy-in from local emergency-management personnel in small towns and rural 
communities across the country and could be accomplished with little additional federal 
funding and no additional local costs.  
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Current DHS funding is mainly targeted towards densely populated areas called 
urban area security initiative (UASI) areas or to critical pieces of infrastructure based 
upon risk. This formula leaves rural or small-town areas out of the funding for 
preparedness. Urban areas rely on government funding, whether local, state, or federal, 
whereas rural areas rely on volunteers and little federal government funding.  
The value innovation of this approach is found in a cooperative, customized 
strategy instead of the mandatory report and compete model used in current DHS funding 
programs. The concept is to drop the current method of competition for grants and federal 
dollars that leaves rural areas out of the picture and instead use the federal government’s 
experience to gain cooperation from rural areas that are used to working with little money 
and few resources everyday. 
C. A STRATEGY CANVAS FOR A NEW RURAL PREPAREDNESS 
DOCTRINE 
A strategy canvas was developed for implementation of the new rural 
preparedness doctrine for DHS. A strategy canvas is used as the main tool in Blue Ocean 
Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 25) and is designed to plot the differentiation 
between the old method and the new method. The canvas is a subjective interpretation of 
facts learned in the research and how they are defined. The horizontal axis captures some 
of the important factors that homeland security professionals might want to consider 
when deciding to move forward with this new strategy. The vertical axis captures a 
subjective value for the DHS in time, resources, funding, and the level of benefit gained 





























































Figure 5.   Multi-Doctrinal Approach to National Preparedness (with the addition of 
Rural Doctrine) 
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Figure 6.   New Rural Preparedness Implementation Strategy: Action Items and Flow 
Chart 
 
Create - Rural / Small-town Homeland Security Strategy 
Guidance for Aligning Strategies with the National 
Preparedness Goal 
Create - Rural / Small-town National Planning Scenario 
guidance with local rural development
Continue - Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium 
continues to create customized rural training for ICS-NIMS 
Create - Rural / Small-town additions to the National Preparedness Guidelines: 
1. The national preparedness vision 
2. The fifteen National Planning Scenarios 
3. Universal Task List (UTL) 
4. Target Capabilities List (TCL).  
Fund Š Regional Preparedness Staff by state EM regions 
for local NIMS leadership 
Appoint - Small State and Rural Advocate at FEMA 
Create Š Plans and exercises customized by local regions 
within a state, based on national guidance 
Conduct Š After-action reviews and local plan updates 
based upon lessons learned 
GOAL Š Small-town and rural preparedness   
meeting national standards! 
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APPENDIX A—INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
1. How would you describe the current status of NIMS implementation or 
adoption in small and rural communities in your county (Law 
enforcement/fire/EMS/public health, public works/emergency management)? 
- Adoption is widespread, implementation is not. 
- NIMS implementation is poor. Personnel have the training but would not 
be proficient in the detailed inner workings of NIMS. 
- Municipal police departments do not want NIMS, won’t use it and don’t 
want to learn it. 
- Full NIMS compliance is a stretch for rural, small-town entities. 
- Implementation has been observed on regional teams. 
- Public works implementation is lacking. 
- The county emergency manager writes all of the emergency operations 
plans for the rural county, so they make them NIMS compliant. 
- Most jurisdictions just self-certify even when they have not met the 
requirements. 
2. What are the factors that are either impeding or facilitating NIMS adoption? 
- Time for volunteer training impedes implementation. 
- Money for paying volunteers to take off of work to attend impedes 
implementation. 
- A lack of understanding that NIMS can be just as effective for rural areas 
as for large cities. 
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- The number of times an agency responds to an emergency can facilitate or 
impede NIMS adoption. 
- Online classes impede implementation. 
- Lack of local support due to a lack of belief in rural applicability of NIMS. 
- One size does not fit all, rural communities are very different from urban 
metropolises. 
- Lack of relevancy in the higher level classes (ICS 300-400). 
- Law enforcement does not use Incident Command. 
- An informal system is in place, just not verbalized. 
- The size of the disaster is not as important as the duration. 
- Must meet day-to-day threats, not disasters that may never occur. 
- An individual municipality’s refusal to take NIMS seriously. 
- Small towns and rural communities are confused by NIMS. 
- No time to go to training and the online training is a “joke” as most cheat 
and get the answers from their friends. 
- The government can not ask volunteers in towns, villages and rural areas 
to do more. 
- Turnover in the volunteer ranks. 
- County EM’s need more personnel and funding to make NIMS a reality. 
- Border counties to other states have trouble interoperating if all are not 
NIMS compliant. 
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- NIMS is not practical for towns and small jurisdictions. 
- E-grants are too hard to complete, many clerks don’t have the internet. 
- Equipment given out in earlier grant programs is now outdated and in need 
of replacement. 
3. What are the differences in levels of preparedness in the various 
communities in your county? 
- The more full-time paid staff, the better trained and prepared in NIMS. 
- Local mutual aid works well with the fire service and law enforcement. 
- Only a few communities are attempting to follow NIMS, the rest are not. 
- The cities within the rural county act alone with no mutual situational 
awareness and no resiliency. 
- There is no consistency or continuity between volunteer agencies. 
- Full-time agencies are more likely to follow NIMS than volunteers leading 
to differing levels of preparedness. 
- Cities have more resources and can get more funding to support 
preparedness. 
- Some don’t have the staff to utilize E-sponder and therefore cannot 
communicate with the state. 
- Local jurisdictions work cooperatively all the time with each other but not 
with federal agencies. 
4. Do these differences affect or impact their ability to respond to interagency 
emergencies where resources are pulled in from a wide area? 
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- Yes, ICS is adopted but rarely used by rural agencies. 
- Cannot manage large numbers of resources. 
- Yes, because of the wide disparity in implementation among responders.  
- Yes, due to a lack of continuity. 
- In a large inter-agency emergency, the locals would rely on the county EM 
to make it work. 
5. If so, what are the problems that you have seen or observed that have 
affected multi-jurisdictional emergency response to large disasters? 
- Lack of training. 
- Lack of real-world experience. 
- Lack of resources and personnel. 
- Lack of mutual aid compacts. 
- Lack of internet access to use E-sponder. 
- An inability to speak the same language. 
- Volunteer fire departments would not deploy. 
- They don’t deploy, nor do they want to deploy to large disasters. 
- Law enforcement feels they just direct traffic at disasters, no need for 
NIMS. 
6. Would law enforcement, fire, EMS, public health, public works or 
emergency management personnel in your county have the knowledge needed to be 
able to deploy to other areas of the state and successfully interoperate in a NIMS-
compliant environment?  
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- No, having the training does not mean competence.  
- Lack of field experience in large-scale disasters. 
- They could deploy but would not be NIMS compliant. 
- Some rural parts of the state have regional mutual-aid agreements and 
would be able to work together. 
- The fire service would mesh into a larger response structure but LE and 
EMS would not. 
- They all run their own command posts with no unified command. 
7. What potential solutions to these problems might you offer based upon your 
experiences that would assist? 
- The problem is not adoption, but implementation. 
- Reimburse volunteer responders for attending training. 
- Regional risk and vulnerability assessments work better than a one size 
fits all approach. 
- Regional Local Tribal Incident Management Teams would help locals to 
meet NIMS requirements if they build trust with the locals. 
- Reduce the required courses for rural areas. 
- Make the training realistic and useful for rural responders and 
jurisdictions. 
- Don’t make unrealistic demands upon volunteers or they will leave. 
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APPENDIX B—WISCONSIN E-SPONDER USERS BY COUNTY 
Wisconsin Emergency Management 
E•SPONDER® Users by County 
1 October 2009 
For Official Use Only 
 
 
ADAMS   5  
ASHLAND   2  
BARRON   5  
BAYFIELD   2  
BROWN   294  
BUFFALO   4  
BURNETT   3  
CALUMET   18  
CHIPPEWA   8  
CLARK   11 
COLUMBIA   18  
CRAWFORD  3  
DANE   80  
DODGE   11 
DOOR   2  
DOUGLAS   3  
DUNN   8  
EAU CLAIRE  32 
FLORENCE   1  
FOND DU LAC  44  
FOREST   2  
GRANT  5  
GREEN   7  
GREEN LAKE  7  
IOWA   1  
IRON    1  
JACKSON   5  
JEFFERSON  10  
JUNEAU   9  
KENOSHA   17  
KEWAUNEE  10  
LA CROSSE   12  
LAFAYETTE  0  
LANGLADE   4  
LINCOLN   3  
MANITOWOC  18  
MARATHON  7  
MARINETTE  4  
MARQUETTE  5  
MENOMINEE   2  
MILWAUKEE   389 
MONROE    10  
OCONTO    4  
ONEIDA    5  
OUTAGAMIE   14  
OZAUKEE    58  
PEPIN    1  
PIERCE    3  
POLK    3  
PORTAGE    11  
PRICE   1  
RACINE    49  
RICHLAND   4  
ROCK    98  
RUSK    1  
ST. CROIX    4  
SAUK    18  
SAWYER    7  
SHAWANO    5  
SHEBOYGAN   27  
TAYLOR    1  
TREMPEALEAU  4  
VERNON   4  
VILAS    3  
WALWORTH   50  
WASHBURN   1  
WASHINGTON  39  
WAUKESHA   229  
WAUPACA   12 
WAUSHARA  4  
WINNEBAGO 50  
WOOD   6 
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